Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives - UK
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Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

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About the CIK Project

The Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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1. **Introduction**

This report overviews narratives of Islamophobia in the United Kingdom using the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHIMIR) (Ameli, 2010) to map the overlapping and interlocking prevalence and impact of such narratives on social and political discourse. This report will overview existing work in the field that measures and narrates the impact of Islamophobia, a background to the Muslim community/ies in the UK, he discussion around definitions of Islamophobia, historical and current events that impact the relationship between the understanding of Muslims in society and their experiences, before outlining the key anti-Muslim narratives operating in British political, media and other discourses. The praxis that reproduces and sometimes undergirds such narratives is pivotal in understanding what Islamophobia is and provides a key tool for policy makers and academics to assess what and how impactful a narrative of Islamophobia is, and Sayyid’s (2012) argument regarding the performative functions of Islamophobia provides a key frame for this report in its presentation of the relationship between the environment created by hate discourses (Ameli and Merali, 2015) and its impact.

Quantitative survey results conducted by Ameli and Merali in 2014 survey results on experiences of Islamophobia found that in comparison to four years earlier, all bar one of the 17 experiences measured in terms of experience of had worsened, and in some cases catastrophically so. In the cases of discrimination at work or school, the experiencing of Islamophobia almost doubled (Ameli and Merali, 2015). In terms of the recurrence of seeing Islamophobia in the media, in 2010 60% of the sample stated they had seen Islamophobia in the media. In 2014 this had risen to 90%, with 40% of those surveyed saying they saw it all the time. Significantly between the survey work of Ameli et al. in 2004 (2004a, b, 2005, 2006a and b, 2007) and 2014, there appeared to be a collapse in faith in the political process amongst Muslims. The results of quantitative surveys used in previous studies (Ameli et al., 2004a,b, 2007 and 2011) the findings were that Muslims sought to seek redress to the many ills they faced including demonized media representation, through engagement in politics, whether as activists, members of political parties or through lobbying. In 2014, this was replaced by a feeling that politicians were also prime producers of Islamophobia and that taking part in political
processes brought no benefits and if anything brought more chagrin onto Muslims. In quantitative terms, in 2010, 56.7% disagreed with the proposition that they had seen political policies negatively affecting Muslims, in 2014 only 14.7% gave the same answer. Where before the media (Ameli et al., 2011) was blamed as the main culprit in creating an Islamophobic climate, the government and political class now seems to be much more at the forefront of Muslim attention. In 2010, 34.2% agreed or strongly agreed that they had seen such policies but in 2014 this had increased to 59.2%.

Ameli and Merali argue that the experience of Islamophobia as understood by Muslims provided within the context of the McPherson Inquiry (1999) and subsequently the Mubarek Inquiry (2006) that the perception by Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim) that they had experienced anti-Muslim racism is enough for the matter to be actionable by whichever appropriate authority. Coming as it does from the perspective of law enforcement that starts with the premise of how to tackle in practical terms the rise of hate crime and discrimination, it acknowledges the existence of the sociological phenomenon of Islamophobia without (as the law also arguably does) requiring a precise definition of what Islamophobia is. Additionally in developing the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR), Ameli (2010) argues that minoritized groups suffer racism as a form of overlapping structural phenomenon (ideology, policy and law, media representation and political discourse) which culminate in its more extreme manifestations, a hate environment. Again, the importance of experience as the effect of narratives employed in the various discourses of culture and praxis provide here the crux of understanding what Islamophobia means to Muslims. The discussion as to what Islamophobia means has been prominent in the United Kingdom since the launch of the Runnymede Trust report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All in 1997. This discussion runs parallel to the approach of Ameli and Merali (2005) and civil society activism in combating Islamophobia. The necessity for both civil society and law and law enforcement to adopt such a route lies in part in the various attempts to define Islamophobia since the launch of the Runnymede Trust report.

The Runnymede Trust report, as critiqued by Sayyid (2014), gives no history to the term ‘Islamophobia’, ‘giving the impression that it is a neologism without any historical depth and completely inspired by the contingencies of “race relations” in Britain.’ Its conceptualization of Islamophobia is to break the idea of it as a bias or prejudice based upon closed ideas of Islam (of which six are cited) and Muslims (of which two are cited). These closed views seek to assign to Muslims immutability of character, and as Sayyid argues, this implicitly recognizes the racialization of Muslims. However the report contextualizes itself upon a recognition of the idea of Muslims as ‘political subject’ post The Rushdie Affair of 1988-9, and as such both the history and impact of long running cultural tropes, colonial praxis and post-colonial domestic contingencies of the British state with regard to ‘race relations’ of such racialization, were lost to the formulation of what anti-Muslim hostility or prejudice looked and felt like. Situating itself in an essentially communitarian framework, the report left itself open to critique from all quarters but primarily from a state and institutions claiming a liberal ideological position. Thus in defining Islamophobia in terms of a hatred of the ideological aspects of Muslim life that are immutable, they raise the following problems for Muslims as political subjects and areas of attack by an establishment claiming to be basing its critique on liberal values:
“(i) it confirms the racists’ perceptions that Muslims can’t help their inferiority. They are innately stupid, immoral or even amoral;

“(ii) it posits Muslims as an ethical problem for liberal society to come to terms with (we disagree with their internal ethics therefore should we intervene or respect their boundaries?)

“(iii) it problematises Muslims at the point of their interaction with society at large i.e. Muslims come to our attention when they try to interact with wider society and this interaction is inevitably problematic as they can never adjust to the morally accepted norm;

“(iv) it requires Muslims to make concessions if they are to be recognised as participants in mainstream society (we shall discuss this in greater detail later)

“(v) it confines Muslim participation in wider society to their identity as Muslims. Therefore it is difficult to find a practising or obvious Muslim holding senior positions in the legal professions, political parties, the media etc. These people are confined to being ‘professional Muslims’ in society, and as such they cannot participate in the present structures let alone participate in changing those structures.” (Shadjareh and Merali, 2002).

As Shadjareh and Merali (2002) further argue, this definition and its focus on immutability leaves out the Islamophobia of those who challenge Muslims upon the basis of their choice to be Muslim, and leaves Muslims facing anti-Muslim racism with the charge that to better their lot they must distance themselves from Muslim belief and practice. A key example of this was the article published in The Independent newspaper the day after the launch of the Runnymede Trust report by Polly Toynbee in which she declared, “I am an Islamophobe and proud of it.” (Toynbee, 1997 cited in Meer, 2010)

Vakil (2009) argues that problem of Islamophobia required an act of naming the function of which was fulfilled by the Runnymede report. He contends that rather than discussing the history of the term, it is more productive to discuss its genealogy, as the process of naming has less to do with historical developments but more to do with the political language and landscape that caused the phenomenon to be named i.e.:

“...to ask not when the term Islamophobia was coined but what political language was required for the concept of Islamophobia to be meaningful. If Islamophobia, a la Runnymede, “(was) coined because there (was) a new reality that need(ed) naming”, and, more crucially, “so that it (could) be identified and acted against”, contra Runnymede, what is significant is not what it names, which is also not a centuries old fear and dread of Islam and Muslims (much less the “unfounded(ness)” of such hostility), but rather that it names; and in naming, the namer it bespeaks rather than the named. Quite the opposite of victimhood, then, Islamophobia is about contestation and the power to set the political vocabulary and legal ground of recognition and redress. It is about the subjectification of Muslim political subject(ivitie)s.”

Accordingly, Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006) argue that Islamophobia as a form of racism is not exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic racism allows the
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Westernized state not to have to listen to the critical thinking of Muslims, whether on domestic or international issues. While the authors argue this particularly in the context of the negation of Islamic thinkers, this can be extended to the idea that Muslims per se, functioning even in the mold of model ‘Western’ citizen, are negated as legitimate actors with legitimate concerns, let alone: ‘The thinking that comes from non-Western locations [that] is not considered worthy of attention except to represent it as “uncivilised,” “primitive,” “barbarian,” and “backward”.’ (Grosfoguel and Mileants, 2006)

This type of epistemic racism allows the state to unilaterally decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility of serious inter-cultural dialogue. Thus Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only manifested in the labour market, education, public sphere, global war against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological battleground about the definition of the priorities of the state and the world today (Grosfoguel and Mileants, 2006)

Thus Islamophobia as understood as a form of racialization that not only discriminates against Muslims, but negates Muslim agency and aspiration forms the crux of an understanding of how Islamophobia functions in the UK context. Contextualizing the type of experiences Ameli et al. (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011 and 2015) outline, with anti-Muslim narratives highlights narratives outlined below provides a context wherein, the claims of subjectification can be understood.

2. State of the art in research on Islamophobia

Taking Klug’s (2013) argument that anti-Semitism curtails the ability of Jews to elaborate what their Jewishness means, Sayyid (2014) argues that Islamophobia can be understood as more than simply an expression of hatred or fear (as the Runnymede Trust report in summary does), Islamophobia needs to be understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future. By using such an approach this reading of Islamophobia’s focus is on the performative functions of Islamophobia that cause the curtailment of Muslims’ ability to articulate themselves as Muslims / citizens and as Muslim citizens.

Sayyid’s focus on the performance of Islamophobia covers six practices: (i) attacks on persons perceived to be Muslim; (ii) attacks on properties considered to be Muslim in nature; (iii) acts of intimidation e.g. marches through Muslim areas, anti-Muslim advertising campaigns etc.; (iv) acts in an institutional setting be they forms of harassment, discrimination or another; (v) incidents in which there is a sustained and systematic elaboration of comments in the public domain that disparage Muslims and/or Islam e.g. publishing the Qur’an with Muhammad listed as the author or recycling medieval Christian polemics as the “truth” about Islam or reading specific crimes as being motivated by Islam or Muslim culture. These five clusters tend to be carried out by individuals or organizations (private or public). The state may facilitate them through benign neglect or refusal to provide
adequate safeguards, or to challenge such actions, but it is not actively or openly involved in the perpetuation of these incidents. However Sayyid’s other set of practices is actively tied to enactment by the State. This can include surveillance, differential treatment by the police, Islamophobia in the criminal justice system, and any act or policy that can be seen as targeting in sole or large part that part of the population which is identified as Muslim.

In looking at the acts as a means to define Islamophobia by its impact on curtailing Muslim agency, expression and forms of futurity, this approach need not be bogged down in the abovementioned disagreements over the term Islamophobia and what its precise definition is. This approach understands Muslims as victims of racialization and racialized discourse and thus victims of racism in the same manner (and often through the same performative functions) as Jews are victims of racism.

Current research into the impact of Islamophobia has focused largely but not solely on Islamophobia in the media in particular news media, and on issues relating to the impact of securitization measures. Poole’s various work on Islamophobia in the media has been critical in bringing together the various narrative strands of Muslim demonization, many of which are outlined below. Poole’s research stretches back to pre-9/11 and provides a link between the cultural tropes identified in English culture by Progler (2008) as inhering key anti-Muslim leitmotifs that undergird an English (and latterly North American) Orientalism and Islamophobia (Ameli and Merali, 2014 and 2015). Crucially, they also highlight that 9/11 is not a key marker in the trajectory of Islamophobic narrative in a way that even the sympathetic commentariat often considers it to be.

This can be elaborated in various forms including the charge of entryism. The denial of Muslim agency, and accusations leveled of ‘entryism’ and privilege by organizations like the Henry Jackson Society (Griffin et al. 2014) serve to curtail Muslims’ elaboration of themselves and exclude them from acceptable social practice. This is highly impactful on the way Muslim civil society operates with many major organizations from the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Cage, IHRC and MEND all targeted as somehow inimical to British values, or acceptable political and civil society norms from the commentariat, the closing down of civil society spaces wherein Muslims can function as Muslims for whichever cause is greatly narrowed in a manner that serves the interest of governmental institutions that simultaneously eschew charges of institutional bias e.g. the refusal to include critical expertise on, and the subsequent failure by government to defend its own Cross-Government Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group when it was attacked by parts of the media for promoting entryism (see below).

Thus forms of Muslim deviance such as sexual perversion and criminality, misogyny and violence as inherent Muslim traits pre-exist in reportage (Poole, 2011 and 2002). Ameli et al (2007) also look at news media but widen the discussion on Muslim representation to literature and film, in an attempt to contextualize the cultural underpinnings of Islamophobic representation. They argue that:
“What brings ‘Western’ texts from separate intellectual disciplines as well as different historical eras together in a single discourse... is the common culture and ideology intrinsic to the discursive practices through which they produce knowledge... These powerful discursive practices make it difficult for individuals to think beyond them. A demonised oriental / Muslim ‘other’ is understood as the normal(ised) oriental/ Muslim ‘other’ and the question of critically examining such representation is a non-starter in the minds of an audience which understands such representation to be given upon which to better base their understanding...”

This function of Islamophobia across different forms of representation forms part of what Ameli (2010) develops in the dominant hate model of intercultural relations as hate representation, part of an overlapping and mutually reinforcing set of state and social behaviors that constitute in extreme manifestation a hate environment against a minority group. The other overlapping functions are political discourse, law and policy, and undergirding all three, ideology.

The ideological underpinnings of state actions in particular regard to securitization lends research in this field to conform to the DHMIR model. Thus works such as Kundnani’s (2012 and 2015) are both indicative of state performances of Islamophobia as per Sayyid and the ideology behind and praxis of Islamophobia that creates an environment of hate against Muslims (as per Ameli, 2012). The outcome of the hate environment in Ameli et al’s thesis is that street level Islamophobia, and such acts as fall under the initial five sets of Islamophobia in Sayyid’s contention arise as a result of state praxis and ideology rather than independently of it. In this context even the rise of a far-right polity and activism is an outcome rather than a case of Islamophobia.

Such work has moved beyond Runnymede definitions of Islamophobia as sets of beliefs and prejudices held largely about Islam and sometimes about Muslims amongst individuals, whether lay people of those working in institutions. Nevertheless the idea of Islamophobia as functioning on the level of individual prejudice of those holding closed views about Muslims and Islam is one that has traction amongst certain advocacy groups and campaigns that seek to change e.g. media perceptions on a case by case basis.¹

Whilst such initiatives have doubtless seen resolution for individual cases of Islamophobia perpetuated by the media, they also serve to perpetuate (without a wider critique) the idea of post-

¹ Enterprises like that of Miqdaad Versi (2017) brought successful challenges to media misrepresentation using existing complaints mechanisms, they undergirded the fact that structural racism as a point of mobilization for oppressed communities has not registered as a need for social transformation. The Stop Funding Hate campaign took a more strategic view, recognizing both the role and responsibility of media as institution(s) and arguing that advocacy related to their corporate interests would be the best way to bring about change, thus acknowledging that the campaign to get large companies to remove advertising would effect change due to damage to business interests rather than a cultural shift or acknowledgement of moral culpability (Merali, 2017b). Advocacy organization MEND looks to: “tackle Islamophobia via advocacy in Westminster and media engagement coupled with empowerment of grass roots British Muslims with media and political literacy”(MEND, undated). Again, the focus is implicitly on the idea of Islamophobia as misperception or prejudice by powerful individuals which can be remedied by participation of Muslims in these institutions, rather than a call for a ‘sea-change’ in the way that institutions think about Muslims and Islam (Ameli et al., 2007).
racial state (Sian, 2010) which in turn strengthens those opposed to tackling Islamophobia as a form of institutionalized racism.

Civil society mobilization against Prevent measures varies from attempts to have the policy moderated or reformed, to calls to scrap it in its entirety (Jones, et al., 2015).

NGO concerns with the rise in hate crimes against Muslims do not need to be informed by a particular definition of what Islamophobia is. Insofar as British law enforcement bodies, notably the various police services across the UK have acknowledged that Islamophobia exists and the law states that Islamophobic motivation can be an aggravating factor in the prosecution of a crime, the recognition of Islamophobia as a performative function operates. Whilst that understanding in both law and at a police policy level exists, a range of critiques of the implementation of the law by the police exists at the civil society level, notably that there is no consistent recording practice, and that there is either no or very poor training of officers and front line staff thus undermining attempts to record and prosecute crimes where motivation may be Islamophobic (Ameli and Merali, 2015, see also MEND, 2014 and 2016). In a comparative study of Muslim experiences in the UK, Ameli and Merali found that there was a 4% rise in the experience of violent attacks by Muslims from their previous research in 2010 and their follow-up in 2014 (Ameli and Merali, 2015). Various reports from NGOs and other civil society organisations across the period defined by the launch of the Runnymede Trust report have employed third party reporting methods to present data on anti-Muslim experiences (see e.g. Citizens Advice Bureau, 2005, IHRC, 2000, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010 and TellMAMA, 2016, as examples). However issues such as persistent underreporting, lack of a national reporting and monitoring infrastructure, and resources issues have meant that such initiatives have been confronted with unsustainability issues as well as presenting statistics based on organizational reach rather than representative samples. This leads to the situation critiqued by Bourne (2010) where the basis of claims regarding the undoubted prevalence of anti-Muslim hatred is hard to gauge.

The experience of racial profiling under anti-terrorism stop and search powers has been critiqued by various NGOs as a given praxis, within a shared understanding between NGOs and institutions, specifically law enforcement related, as to what racial profiling means and how this concept has been and can be extended to cover the profiling of Muslims as a racialized group (see Rowlands, 2010 for Statewatch, IHRC, 2008, Ansari, 2005 and 2006 for IHRC and Kundnani, 2006 for Institute of Race Relations as examples).

Concerns raised in the work of Chakroborti and Zempi (2014) regarding the treatment of women in niqab at a street level, highlight the increasing concern at the grassroots level of the attacks on Muslim women. Whilst organizations claiming there is a preponderance of attacks on Muslim women usually operate a third-party reporting system upon which they base their claims (thus arguably it
appears Muslim women are less reluctant to report Islamophobia than Muslim men), Ameli and Merali (2015, 2011, 2004 and 2000) use survey work which indicates that since their 2004 findings this is not the case. However they do note that the type of attacks faced by Muslim women are fixated on their identity as Muslim women, rather than simply as Muslim. The nature of attacks examined in an overview of cases available for analysis showed an overwhelming fixation on either pulling off pieces of clothing (usually face veils or headscarves) and touching. Both types of attacks stem from the sexualization of the female Muslim subject and the idea that she is aberrant to British norms by not allowing herself to be viewed in the same way as other women in the UK, and not allowing herself to be touched (Ameli and Merali, 2015). There is clearly a gendered aspect to Islamophobic acts that can be traced back to the tropes around gender that will be discussed below. Various authors and NGOs have highlighted the prevalence of gender specific hate crime directed at Muslim women in various European settings including the UK. Many infer that visible Muslimness expressed in forms of dress is a marker of negative experience, with Šeta (2016 for ENAR) arguing that Muslim women experience greater frequency of hate crimes than Muslim men based on third-party reporting and monitoring projects in various countries including the UK.

Other scholars, NGOs and authors refer to the differential treatment of Muslim protestors at pro-Gaza / Palestine demonstrations by police and subsequently prosecutions of protestors as a result, highlight that there can be argued to be such a thing as one law for Muslims and one for everyone else (Majeed, 2010, Gilmore, 2013). The basis upon which police profiling took place (IHRC, 2002) and upon which sentences were based (Majeed, 2010 and Gilmore, 2013) took as their basis Muslim delinquency as a starting point.

Accusations against state institutions such as the Charity Commission promoting an Islamophobic agenda, in particular after a former Henry Jackson Society member became its chair in 2012, have been made, by inter alia the head of charity leaders group Acevo, and Cage, with other third sector figures also raising concerns from within and without the Muslim charitable sector (Burne James, 2014). In particular the focus on Muslim charities under the new regime as possible incubators or supporters of ‘extremism’ (Belaon, 2014 for Claystone) has added to pre-existing charges from Muslim civil society that their charities were always under more intense scrutiny than similar charities from different faith and non-faith backgrounds (Kroessin, 2007). Nevertheless there have been changes and shifts in institutional cultures regarding Islamophobia. Post the 7-7 attacks in the UK, IHRC noted (2006b) that both the Metropolitan Police Service and national media had made a concerted effort not to repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, including unfounded speculation on the religion and alleged religious motivations of the perpetrators. Despite the aforesaid failings, police services have recognized the need to record Islamophobic incidents. However, such shifts have been countered by the continued and in some cases new forms of Islamophobic behaviors from institutions. The perpetration of Islamophobia by police services has shifted from racialized profiling for delinquency e.g. in the prelude to the riots of the summer of 2001, to racialized policing that focuses on Muslims as potential terrorists, a form of delinquency that is set out by the raft of anti-terrorism laws and policies as an entirely different regime from existing criminal codes. The impact then of laws to record and potentially prosecute individual acts of Islamophobia pale into insignificance when the service charged with doing so is
perpetrating Islamophobia on a mass scale. The findings of Ameli et al. (2004b) that gender was no longer a variable in the experience of Islamophobia was explained in large part by the huge number of arrests under anti-terrorism laws of Muslim men. This meant that in 2004, 80% of the sample, whether male or female had experienced Islamophobia, a jump from 45% in 2000 (IHRC, 2000) where gender was an impactful variable.2

3. **Background: Muslim population in the country**

According to the 2011 census, the most comprehensive and recent data available, the Muslim population of England and Wales numbered 2,706,066 comprising 4.8% of the total population3. In Northern Ireland the respective figures stood at 3832 and 0.2% (Northern Ireland). Of these 52% were men and 48% women. Both the other territories of the United Kingdom contain proportionately smaller Muslim minorities. The same census recorded Scotland as having 76,737 Muslims or 1.4% of the total population (Statistics and Research Agency)4.

Muslims in England and Wales are ethnically diverse. Two-thirds (68 per cent) were from an 'Asian' background, including 'Pakistani' (38 per cent), 'Bangladeshi' (14.9 per cent) and 'Indian' (7.3 per cent). The proportion of Muslims reporting as 'Black/African/Caribbean/Black British' was 10 per cent while those identifying themselves as 'White' stood at 7.8 per cent. Those reporting as 'Arab' totaled 6.6 per cent, 'Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Group' 3.8 per cent and 'Any Other Ethnic Group' 4.1 per cent. Just over half of all Muslims (53 per cent) in 2011 were born outside the UK.

The Muslim population in England and Wales has a younger age profile than the rest of the population. Approximately 33% are aged 15 years or under compared to 19% of the overall population. At the other end of the age spectrum only four per cent of Muslims were aged 65 or over against 16 per cent for the overall population. The median age of the Muslim population is 25 years, compared to 40 years for the overall population5.

The distribution profile of Muslims in England and Wales is one of urban concentration. 76% of Muslims live in four regions: London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and The Humber reflecting post-war patterns of immigration and settlement in industrial conurbations. Of the 348 local authority districts in England and Wales, 35 contain a Muslim population of 10% or more (MCB, 2015).

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2 The 2000 and 1999 figures showed that if you were a woman your experience of Islamophobia was much higher than if you were a man.
4 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/Equalities/DataGrid/Religion/RelPopMig
Unlike Christianity, Islam, in common with other non-Anglican religions, enjoys no official recognition in the British political system. As the established religion, the Church of England is the state church and is presided over by the reigning monarch who is at once the head of state and its Supreme Governor. The practical product of this historic relationship is that the Church of England is allocated 26 permanent seats in the Upper House of Parliament.

The first major attempt at association-forming by Muslims on the basis of faith came in 1970 with the formation of the Union of Muslim Organisations. While it presented itself as an umbrella group representing the Muslims of the UK and Eire, the UMO's affiliation with the Islamic Cultural Centre in London and by extension the representatives of foreign governments who form the Centre's trustees, prevented it from making any significant traction.

The Satanic Verses controversy in 1988 provided the impetus for Muslims to organize politically in response to domestic concerns. Characterized by fragmentation along ethnic, nationalistic, sectarian lines and even according to political affiliations in their countries of origin, attempts were made by the Muslim Parliament and the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) to form bodies geared to representing Muslims in Britain.

The Muslim Parliament pitched itself as an independent body fighting Muslims' corner against an antagonistic state. At the time British government policy on the Satanic Verses affair and the conflict in majority-Muslim Bosnia was the subject of vigorous opposition from the Muslim community. In its structure the Muslim Parliament sought to replicate the British parliament by having it members popularly elected by UK Muslims. However, from the outset it lacked popular support because it was seen as a creation of Iran owing to its inception under the aegis of the Iranian sponsored Muslim Institute and its charismatic director Dr. Kalim Siddiqui who was a vocal supporter of the Iranian revolution. It eventually fell apart after the death of its founder Dr. Kalim Siddiqui in 1996.

The British government shunned the Muslim Parliament preferring the more conciliatory UKACIA as a negotiating partner. UKACIA itself used the opening provided by the government’s eschewal of the Muslim Parliament to secure access to ministers. At its inception UKACIA saw itself as an interlocutor for Muslim concerns but in 1997 morphed into the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). An umbrella group for several hundred UK Muslim organizations, the MCB saw itself as the major representative body for the Muslim community in its dealings with the state. Initially supported by the government as a potentially reliable partner the MCB found itself shunned when it began to oppose government policy most notably with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and anti-terrorism legislation that flowed from the Sept 11, 2001 attacks on the US.

The result was that more Muslim organisations emerged to fill the "acceptable partner" void, none of which incidentally, can claim any meaningful level of support within the Muslim community.
Thus hitherto, the British state's relationship with the Muslim population can be said to be one of trying to co-opt it by encouraging the formation of and/or seeking out willing groups. Since the turn of the millennium this has been done against the background of a strategy that aims to engineer a Muslim community that is both less conservative in outlook and readily compliant with government policy. The main tool for this social engineering program has been anti-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation.

4. **Background: the formation of anti-Muslim hatred**

The role of the British in the transatlantic slave trade brings the nascent imperial power into direct colonial contact with Muslim subjects, those perceived to Muslims subjects. The skepticism with respect to the humanity of the indigenous would be transposed and readapted to the African slave (Maldanao-Torres, 2014). This fundamental questioning of the humanity of those enslaved forms a basis for discourses of sub-alternization in the modern era (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006) that finds expression in British narratives of ‘otherness’.

Whilst British involvement with the slave trade began in the reign of Elizabeth I, there was clearly interaction with and adaptation of established narratives that justify slavery. Best, for example, sought biblical justification for enslavement in a British narrative that claimed Africans to be the descendants of Ham (Noah’s son) cursed to be dark skinned for his sin (Woodward, 1999). The collapse of the idea of Muslimness and Blackness, and Muslimness and barbarity (viewed through the European conceptualization of ‘Saracen’ in the context of the Crusades (historically) and the rise of the Ottoman caliphate (contemporaneously) provide a context for a sustained narrative of the Muslim as subaltern.

With the colonization of India by the British we see another set of interactions where political expediency demands another set of justifications for control and subjugation. Padamsee (undated) cites the term ‘mussulmanophobic’ (a phrase coined by one official to explain the Indian Civil Service mindset in 1857 at the time of the Mutiny), as an apt descriptive analysis of the perception amongst the service that there had been a co-ordinated Muslim conspiracy that led to the Mutiny. The facets of this conspiracy ascribed fanaticism, bloodthirstiness and the idea of wider Muslim complicity based on bonds of faith rather than evidence (which official enquiries refuted as existing). This narrative also ascribed the idea of Muslims as inherently inimical to the British and requiring mobilization of the Raj along sectarian lines to control the program. Thus a specific policy addressed to Muslims or sets of policies was born. Padamsee recalls that the persuasiveness of the narrative undergirded relations between the colonial authorities and Muslims for the rest of the century. The retaking of Delhi in 1857, notes Padamsee, was accompanied in this vein by a symbolic ‘unofficial ceremony that took place in the palace of the deposed Mughal emperor in which English officers solemnly ate pork and drank wine. Cohn refers to this tableau as the ‘desacralisation’ of the Mughal palace, and therefore Mughal rule...’
1. The concept of despotism which provided a foil to internal European excesses, be they of the Republican or monarchical variety

2. The imposture of the Islamic Prophet, used by the likes of Voltaire to discredit all religions

3. The seraglio, which negated sexuality

These tropes can be found regurgitated in various ways. This can be seen in the idea of sexuality negated. Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation. Likewise an idea of Muslim female perversion has developed (further) around ‘veils’, ‘burqas’ and ‘headscarves’. This also inheres in headlines and stories relating to the undermining of British values by the so-called Trojan Horse affair, whereby the idea of single-sex schooling or gender segregation again infer perverse sexuality. Issues around the normative teaching of homosexuality are also invoked repeatedly, highlighting again an idea of Muslim moral failure (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

The issue of face-veiling however is not the full extent of demonization of Muslim female identity. It is a marker of it. Social and cultural mores regarding Muslims, seen through the prism of sexuality are, as with other tropes, prone to shifting symbols and narratives. During the course of colonization in Africa and Asia, where Islam was prevalent, the idea of Muslims as having a licentious sexual culture (in comparison to a modest, chaste Christian culture) abounded, hence the seraglio and the harem. However, over the last one hundred years this has reversed as the narrative for post-colonial domination has turned to ‘freedom’ and individual liberty. The harem - previously a sign of sexual license, is now seen as an arena of sexual subjugation. The only constant is the idea that whatever Muslims and Islam are, culturally they can only be seen through a homogenized and limited narrative lens.

From the foregoing it is clear that demonization of Muslims has been both latent in Anglophonic culture but also part of a cycle of policy and narrative over the course of centuries where such tropes have served politically expedient purposes. This conforms to Vakil’s (2009) contention that the naming of ‘Islamophobia’ in the post-Rushdie context is a recognition not of a new and more apparent problem within the narrow confines of British race relations in the late 1980s through to the late 1990s, but the articulation of a term that can capture the experiences and dehumanization long felt by Muslims as a result of particular interaction with, in this case, British institutions and the British state, whether as citizen or colonial subject or slave.

5. **Categorical list of most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred**

It is significant that there has been a consistent feeling that political discourse has worsened with
regard to Islamophobia and racism, particularly after the 2016 murder of MP Jo Cox. It is alarming not least because the survey of Muslims in 2014 by the IHRC found that between the 2010 and 2014 results for the question, “How often have you heard Islamophobic comments by politicians?” had significantly worsened.

The ten narratives (not ranked as below) to be overviewed:

(i) Disloyalty and the Threat to Internal Democracy

The rise of the narrative of Muslims as disloyal (and therefore in need of social engineering and state intervention), and its development into a narrative of Muslims as ostracized and outliers who perfect strategies of entryism as a means to inveigle themselves into institutions and positions of power has picked up a pace in recent years. This has then been used to imply that there is a substantive threat to internal democracy from Muslim participation in civic life – even when the model of participation is based on established models of civic engagement. This then feeds further into the idea of Muslim deviance and threat, and undergirds policies that seek to curtail Muslim engagement in civil institutions as well as silence their protests regarding any number of issues.

The idea of the disloyal Muslim is not new, and the specter of the ‘cricket test’ was first raised vis a vis the perceived loyalties or lack thereof to the British state by Lord Tebbit, a former Conservative MP and minister in 1990 who claimed that British born South Asians failed to show patriotic allegiance to the country citing their perceived loyalty to the cricket teams of their ethnic heritage. This trope has resurfaced many times, with Tebbit himself claiming post the 7-7 attacks in London, that had action been taken when he first raised the idea, the attacks may have been prevented (Daily Mail, 2015). Despite much criticism the concept has not faded and resurfaces frequently with regard to Muslim disloyalty claims.

Tony Blair’s undermining of the idea of Muslim grievance regarding British foreign policy is an example of how the ideas of legitimate political protest and expressing political ideas were demonized with regard to Muslims. In a TV interview recorded just prior to his departure from Downing Street in 2007, he reinforced his criticism of ‘Islamists’ within the context of national security, claiming that the battle against ‘terrorists’ would be lost if mainstream society didn’t confront it, stating: “The reason we are finding it hard to win this battle is that we’re not actually fighting it properly. We’re not actually standing up to these people and saying, “It’s not just your methods that are wrong, your ideas are absurd. Nobody is oppressing you. Your sense of grievance isn’t justified.” Additionally in the same interview he stated that:” ‘The idea that as a Muslim in this country that you don’t have the freedom to express your religion or your views, I mean you’ve got far more freedom in this country than you do in most Muslim countries.” (Watt, 2007)

This intervention, as a continued extrapolation of Blair’s thinking that arguably undergirds much of New Labour’s policies since 1997, collapses the idea of Muslim domestic grievance vis a vis racism and Islamophobia, with political grievances regarding international affairs, with the idea of Muslim

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6 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/jul/01/uk.terrorism
disloyalty and threat. Additionally, in highlighting the idea of a British ‘here’ as opposed to a Muslim ‘there’, he emphasized the foreignness of Muslims to the idea of Britain – a type of reverse engineered ‘cricket test’.

The idea then is that Muslim disloyalty is anti-democratic and inculcates the idea that they need disciplining ‘here’ and democratization ‘there’ by way of military adventures.

Repeated speeches and articles by Tony Blair and David Cameron, as well as other political figures and commentators, play on the idea of the UK as a tolerant country of equal opportunity, the only barriers to which are (a) a recalcitrant Muslim community unwilling to integrate; (b) the existence within state structures and institutions of Muslim community figures who are symbols of the failure of multicultural praxis. Thus the frequent ‘outing’ of Islamists by the media of the 2000s (e.g. the ‘exposé’ of Azad Ali, a senior civil servant at the Treasury as a so-called Islamist that led to his removal from his post), has now changed in tone. Even participation by appointment by a minister (if that minister is Muslim) is seen as entryism, not legitimate political participation (Gilligan, 2015 cited in Ameli and Merali, 2015).

A number of the attacks on Ali were spearheaded by Andrew Gilligan, a neo-conservative leaning journalist who has held roles under the London Mayoral administration of Boris Johnson, as well as working on stories like the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair. His 2015 attack on Muslims sitting on the ‘cross-Government working group on anti-Muslim hatred’ and their appointment by erstwhile minister Baroness Sayeeda Warsi (also a Muslim), re-coined the term ‘entryism’. As Bodi (2015) argued Gilligan had:

“...devised [as] a new term for Muslims exercising their right to compete for and hold political positions. It's called entryism. Apparently it's the process whereby extremists consciously seek to gain positions of influence to better enable them to promote their own values. Wait a minute, doesn't that look like the right wing of the Tory Party?”

Thus political participation by Muslims in conventional ways are rebranded and demonized. Polling in the run-up to the selection of party candidates to stand as Mayor London in 2016 found that 1 in 3 Londoners (a city where 65% of the population is not white British) are uncomfortable with the idea of a Muslim mayor (Yougov / LBC cited in 5Pillars.com, 13 August 2015). This is despite the fact that the two key Muslim mayoral candidate candidates (Sadiq Khan of the Labour Party and Syed Kamall of the Conservative party) have held high ranking political positions. Khan was an erstwhile government Minister and a member of the Shadow Cabinet, as well as Chair of the human rights organization Liberty. Kamall is an MEP and also leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament.

7 Azad Ali was a civil servant at the Treasury, as well as holding various civil society posts as a Muslim spokesperson and activist. A number of targeted media attacks in 2009 and 2010, labelled Ali an Islamist extremist and led to his resignation firstly from the Muslim Safety Forum (a body that at one stage was in consultation with the Metropolitan Police over anti-terror policing) and subsequently from his job at the Treasury.
The election campaign run by Conservative Mayoral candidate for London, Zac Goldsmith, was accused of using Islamophobia to target his Labour opponent and eventual winner Sadiq Khan. This included accusing Khan of supporting extremism and sharing a platform with an extremist. The accusation was then repeated in Parliament by the Prime Minister and subsequently out of Parliament by the Defense Minister Michael Fallon (Merali, 2017b).

The long-running idea that Muslims in the public space are problematic as expressed before 9-11 (Poole, 2011), has turned into arguments of entryism and takeover of public life. The practical impact and the injustice of this narrative are exemplified by the Fundamental British Values (FBV) policy and the Trojan Horse affair respectively, both discussed below.

(ii) Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’

Despite harshly criticizing the Trojan Horse investigations, the House of Commons Education Committee repeats supremacist notions of universalism. The Trojan Horse affair raised the specter of a concerted plan by ‘Islamists’ to take over several state schools. Reported thus in the media, it was picked up by government which launched the above litany of investigations at huge public expense, none of which found any wrong-doing on the pat of those involved (bar one example of inappropriate language being used in a private messaging group amongst some teachers). What was obscured in the reporting and even the investigations was that those involved were being judged on the basis of their actions and aspirations set within otherwise acceptable norms with regard to education in the United Kingdom. As Sir Tim Brighouse (7 June 2014), a former chief education officer of Birmingham and schools commissioner for London, described as the practices of many white parents trying to use existing opportunities created by the arrival of free schools and academies to the British education system as:

“an open season for lay people and professionals keen to pursue their own eccentric ideas about schooling: and when trust or governor vacancies occur, some perpetuate the very English tradition of inviting friends to join them. When the community is white it doesn’t cause much comment. In mono-ethnic east Birmingham, however, it is seen as a Muslim plot to expose pupils to an undefined “extremism”.”

The British values which are now to be promoted in all schools are universal and an important part of what children should learn. Grosfoguel (2013) highlights how values e.g. human rights, gender equality, democracy, are represented as already existing European norms (norms which are used in clash of civilization theories like Huntington’s (Foreign Affairs, 1993) which are inherently European and mark our Eurocentric societies as superior to all others. This runs counter not just to decolonial theories but even minority rights regimes developed after the Second World War through international covenants and treatises. Whilst the right to educate your child in your faith is a right given to all parents, rights protecting various aspects of minority cultures form the basis of minority rights and were developed specifically as a result of the Holocaust and the lead up to it. Adams,
quoting the assistant deputy head at one of the affected schools (Lee Donaghy) identifies how that runs counter (Adams, 14 May 2014) to the idea of raising achievement through cultural values, and actually marginalizes minorities:

“Part of us getting excellent results has been about reflecting the wishes and needs of the community in the school. We would not have got those results without doing those things that mean that parents trust us and that kids are comfortable here.”

The Trojan Horse affair led to four separate inquiries: three ordered by the education secretary, Michael Gove, including the Ofsted inspections of 21 schools... There are also investigations by the Education Funding Agency and then a separate inquiry into extremism led by the former Met police anti-terrorism chief Peter Clarke.” Another Birmingham wide enquiry was also undertaken by Birmingham City Council, (Adams, 2014).

Even though all five enquiries found no conspiracy, yet teachers and parent governors found themselves banned from holding positions in the educational profession or as governors, schools involved were downgraded by the educational inspectorate (Ofsted) from outstanding to failing, and their internal hierarchies entirely changed by official intervention. At the time of writing some teachers have had their bans overturned with their treatment being heavily criticized by those adjudicating their cases as ‘serious procedural impropriety’ (Adams, 2016).

Despite a House of Commons Education Committee also investigating the matter and being deeply critical of the whole affair, there have been no repercussions for any of those in power, whether ministers or local authorities who pursued the extraordinary investigations. Instead there has been major damage perpetrated on the schools involved. Other schools in areas such as Tower Hamlets became the victims of what was dubbed Trojan Horse 2, as well as actual Muslim schools. Additionally, the idea of dual educational space (Ameli et al., 2005), religious rights and basic recognition of students’ identities, the rights already conferred on students by Department of Education guidelines, have all been undermined. Legitimate aspirations, such as those of Muslim educationalists, including teachers and governors, have been portrayed as sinister (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

(iii) Muslims and ‘extremism’

Political narratives of condemnation were almost universal with the erstwhile education secretary describing the Trojan Horse investigations as a process of ‘draining the swamp’, and his opposite number Tristram Hunt, criticizing Gove as being “soft” on extremism.

This idea of ‘extremism’ a more lay fascination with the idea of the Muslim ‘despot’ referred to above, has covered a variety of functions across the decades. At the time of the Rushdie Affair (1989), the term became synonymous with the idea of a British Muslim polity unwilling to adopt the value of ‘free speech’. This has ironically come to mean in the last decade inter alia, Muslims who abuse free
speech in promoting grievances. This doublestandard regarding free speech (Muslims simultaneously denying the importance of this (Rushdie affair) and abusing it and needing to be censored and / or excluded from political space and debate (unjust grievances and promotion of ‘extremism’) is illustrated as crossing political and media spheres in many ways. In 2002 Boris Johnson, then editor of The Spectator, claimed Muslim extremists feared women (Merali, 2002). As Mayor of London, his remarks claim that statements made by Muslims, including those expressing concern over Islamophobic language, are somehow promoting an ‘extremist’ violent agenda (Ameli and Merali, 2015). He berated the national umbrella organization, the Muslim Council of Britain, for its complaints regarding Islamophobia thus:

“To any non-Muslim reader of the Koran, Islamophobia - fear of Islam - seems a natural reaction, and, indeed, exactly what that text is intended to provoke...It is time that we started to insist that the Muslim Council of Great Britain, and all the preachers in all the mosques, extremist or moderate, began to acculturate themselves more closely to what we think of as British values.” (Hill, 8 September 2009).

In 2013, he called for parents who taught their children ‘extremist views’ to be treated as child abusers and their children taken into care (Johnson, 2 March 2014), claiming that the state had been woefully inadequate in intervening in minority affairs:

“We need to be less phobic of intrusion into the ways of minority groups and less nervous of passing judgment on other cultures. We can have a great, glorious, polychromatic society, but we must be firm to the point of ruthlessness in opposing behavior that undermines our values. Pedophilia, FGM, Islamic radicalization – to some extent, at some stage, we have tiptoed round them all for fear of offending this or that minority.”

‘Our values’ in this piece by Johnson, are set against Islamic ones (earlier in the piece he refers to British values again). By associating pedophilia and FGM with Islamic radicalization he further catalyses the imagery of the Muslim as sexual predator (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Just as extremism cannot be defined so too is the list of ‘British Values’, raised by the Blair government as a type of ‘cricket test’ for acceptable behaviors for Muslims and Muslim civil society, incapable of definition.

The use of criteria to define extremism through a securitized lens mirrors the implementation of FBV in educational settings. A 2009, a leaked document described:

“government and civil servants were planning to widen the definition of exactly what beliefs constituted extremist views and sought their incorporation into the revised anti-terror strategy. The leaked document mentioned specifically the following issues as of particular concern to those attempting to define extremist views:
“• They advocate a caliphate, a pan-Islamic state encompassing many countries.

“• They promote Sharia law.

“• They believe in jihad, or armed resistance, anywhere in the world. This would include armed resistance by Palestinians against the Israeli military.

“• They argue that Islam bans homosexuality and that it is a sin against Allah.

“• They fail to condemn the killing of British soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan.” (IHRC, 2009).

The teaching of British Values, named in policy documentation as FBV was a measure introduced in the wake of the Trojan Horse affair claiming to teach inter alia ‘gender equality, democracy and rule of law’ (Wintour, 2014). This list presumes itself to be a counter to the list of ‘extremist’ behaviors the Trojan Horse schools were investigated for and leaves a legacy in educational circles that posits Muslim behavior as deviant, despite such behavior being no different to that of other citizens, students or citizens’ groups. In a court judgment in 2016, one of the tropes of the Trojan Horse Affair i.e. gender segregation at school, gender discrimination against women was held not to be the case8. Yet, one of FBV’s premises was and continues to be based on the trope of Muslim misogyny.

(iv) Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)

The Preventing Violent Extremism policy (PREVENT) has been in operation since 2005 across the UK, and was made a statutory obligation on all public workers through the Counterterrorism and Security Act (2015). In essence the Act made it a duty for public sector workers (e.g. doctors, teachers, social workers) to report anyone they feared was an extremist or at risk of radicalization. Whilst referrals were already under criticism before the duty was imposed, the subsequent spike in referrals has shown that the operation of anti-Muslim narratives has had a huge impact on the type of cases referred. School children in particular have found themselves to be vulnerable to referral to de-radicalization programs and / or the involvement of the police on the most spurious of reasons. This includes the referral of a child aged four, for drawing pictures of a cucumber clock (misheard to be a cooker bomb by a teacher) (PreventWatch 2016).

The Channel program is the process by which the government tries to ‘de-radicalize’ people at risk of being drawn into extremism. It is part of PREVENT, and was introduced by the government in 2006. The panel is made up of local police, social services, PREVENT officers, and their job is to create a de-radicalization plan for those identified at risk of being drawn into extremism or terrorism. Little is known of how the program operates as most of those who have been put through the program have refused to speak (Mohamed., 2015).

8 The Interim Executive Board of X School v HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills [2016] EWHC 2813 the Court decided that any detriment was suffered by both genders equally and therefore could not amount to sex discrimination against girls; there was no discernible detriment toward one gender over the other as both genders were denied the opportunity to interact with one another (Wilkins, 2016).
While the Channel program conjures up images of Orwell’s thought police, the PREVENT program goes further in seeking to control people’s ideas and beliefs. As one commentator put it: PREVENT has created a category of ‘thoughtcrime’ for Muslims by which certain ideas and beliefs such as the right to armed resistance, wear religious attire or conscionably oppose homosexuality is referrable to the PREVENT police (Bodi, 2015). Recently David Cameron spoke about how some in the Muslim community were quietly condoning extremist ideology and that it was not sufficient to be law abiding citizens: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens ‘as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone’.” Cameron’s speech was reported perversely as “UK Muslims Helping Jihadis” by the Daily Mail. (Groves, 19 June 2015)

Sian (2013) critiques the existing Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) measures being implemented in schools:

“The rehashing of such accounts including the ‘culture clash,’ religious hatred, alienation and so on (Alexander 2000, xiii), are never deployed to explain white activity, as such they remain locked into assumptions replete with elements from the immigrant imaginary (Sian 2011, 118), that is a series of discursive representations based around the ontological and temporal distinction between host and immigrant (Hesse and Sayyid 2006)... As David Tyrer (2003) points out the specific marking of Muslims reinforces and ‘...fixes the representation of Muslims as criminalised, and thus valorises the logics of racist pathology’ (184).” (Sian, 2013:6)

This ‘logic’ extends into the narratives of Muslim entryism and ostracism and threat in the Trojan Horse scandal as Professor Gus John sums up:

“Michael Gove, under the pretext of responding to anonymous claims in an unsigned letter, appears to be seeking to establish grounds for extending the ‘Prevent Terrorism’ agenda to schools with a certain percentage of Muslim students. British-born school students, teachers and governors belonging to this particular faith group are therefore likely to be subject to surveillance in much the same way as they are in further and higher education. Mr Gove presumably makes no connection between this saga, the xenophobic support for UKIP that we witnessed in the latest elections and the British Social Attitudes survey results regarding the percentage of people in the population who describe themselves as ‘racist’.” (2014)

Sian (2013) identifies how managing of the term Islamophobia (pre-dating the current security focus on Muslims) fuels the ability of state organs to enact policies with a deeply ideological purpose. Following Sayyid’s conceptualization of Islamophobia (2010) as ‘the disciplining of Muslims by reference to an antagonistic western horizon’ (Sayyid 2010a, 15 as argued by Sian, 2013) Sian believes this governing or ‘disciplining’ of Muslim bodies can clearly be seen at work in the PVE initiative.”

This meta-narrative of discipline links the foregoing to the current praxis of PVE. As the prevailing
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discourse seeks to deter Muslims from speaking out against injustices either at home or abroad, any attempt not to conform to this containment or to have any sort of agency is seen as evidence of deviance (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

At the time of writing a mooted Extremism Bill appears to have been dropped from the government’s legislative programme having featured in its proposed legislation for two years (Daily Record, 2017). Instead a Counter Extremism Commission has been proposed that would carry the same statutory weight as the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. The previously argued for Extremism Bill would most notably have allowed the banning of organizations deemed to be extremist. Despite leading lawyers arguing that the term ‘extremism’ would be difficult to define in law. It is unclear whether the Commission is a way of circumventing the problems of enactment, using the precedent of the foregoing narratives that have informed policy in a mutually constitutive way.

(v) Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman

Various tropes are subsumed in this narrative that harks back to the idea of the seraglio (Progler, 2008 referred to above) and the women of the harem. Whilst the idea of the sexuality of the Muslim woman has transformed from the harlot of the harem (Ameli and Merali, 2014) to that of sexually oppressed/submissive (with veil as a symbol of this), there continues to be a concurrent dissonant narrative of Muslim women as dangerous and criminal, as well as the cultural and physical vanguard of the supposed ‘Islamisation’ of society.

The ‘Muslim woman’ as pre-eminent symbol of Muslimness has a long pedigree. Part of this stems from a cultural obsession and the fetishization of the ‘veil’, construed broadly and practically as types of clothing that mark Muslim women out as Muslim. These range from head coverings, face coverings, long pieces of clothing, and at different times ‘ethnically’ marked clothing like shalwar kameez and even saris. Of these the head-covering or potential for head covering in dress has taken on a highly politicized significance dominating discussions about Islam and Muslim in the UK at various times. The tropes can be classified as the Muslim woman/veil: oppressed / tool of oppression; danger or criminal or terrorist / instrument of disguise or security threat; sexually oppressed / tool of sexual oppression; submissive / tool of submission and symbol of silencing; and cultural and physical vanguard of looming Islamisation by virtue of forced conversions and high birth rates.

The ‘veil’ as a cypher for the oppression of Muslim women has a history in recent colonial discourses, substituting the idea of the harlot of the harem, whose sexuality was constructed in the Eurocentric/colonial psyche as outrageous and in need of containment and moral redemption. It was reconstructed in time as the "submissive" and "sexually repressed" that needs liberating (Merali, 2016a). Both themes are reflected in the production of pornographic imagery of Muslim women from the Victorian era to the current era, highlighting in extremis the sexualization of the discourse around Muslim women, which is impactful when reading attacks on Muslim women at the street and social level. In this reading attacks against Muslim women which can be characterized as motivated by gender, usually involve either an attack on the veil (throwing alcohol on it, trying to pull it off etc.) and/or an attempt to touch the victim by doing so. The acting of touching in this scenario may in
other cases be also construed as sexual harassment as it invokes the idea that Muslim women in order to be regulated by that act require to be socialized to a ‘British’ norm of femininity that includes the ability of men to touch without censure, and the idea that ‘British’ women are uninhibited and allow this. Had such an act been committed within the context of a gender motivation, it would be considered at best misogynistic and at worst a sex crime and would undermine the ‘logic’ of the attack itself.

In January 2016, erstwhile Prime Minister David Cameron announced measures to tackle extremism and promote integration based on a focus on Muslim women whom he deemed to be ‘traditionally submissive’ and unable to speak English in large numbers (Hughes, 2016). This initiative collapses the idea of Muslim women as both submissive, sexually oppressed and repressed and a danger (including a terrorist threat) into one trope with the addition of ‘ill-educated’ and ‘unintegrated’ into the mix, claiming inter alia the fact that some women may not speak English adequately could be a precursor to their sons joining terrorist groups, as well as the reason why 60% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are economically inactive (ignoring reliable date on the levels and operation of anti-Muslim prejudice in employment). The idea of Muslim illiteracy in political discourse is not recent, and harks back several decades and will be discussed below (Muslims as subhuman).

Cameron’s comments come out of an increased focus on Muslim women that finds a long history in the trope of the seraglio and the negation of sexuality that Progler (2008) argues is one of three key formulations of ‘Islamic’ identity in Western European culture, in particular English (speaking) cultures.

In its current incarnation Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation, and will be discussed below. Likewise an idea of Muslim female perversion has developed around ‘veils’, ‘burqas’ and ‘headscarves’. This also inheres in headlines and stories relating to the undermining of British values by the so-called Trojan Horse affair, whereby the idea of single-sex schooling or gender segregation again infer perverse sexuality.

The stigmatization of the face-veil is not new in the last five years but has gathered pace and found more succor from legislation in France and Belgium, thus providing space for the commentariat to make repeated accusations of the veil being a sign of separation (first propounded by a politician, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw in 2006) or a sign of misogynistic value and male control, or both. Bans on face veils in the UK (e.g. at some schools), however have often been made on the grounds of security (i.e. not being able to identify the wearer). Stories relating to a bombing suspect fleeing in a burqa have stoked this, but Williamson and Khiabany (2010) provide other examples where wearing a veil at school has been discussed as an extreme security threat collapsing: “the issue of security into that of ‘threats to our way of life’. This reported the comments of a judge to the effect that allowing veil wearing in schools could allow a recurrence of the primary school massacre which took place in Scotland in March 1996.”

9 ‘School veils allow new Dunblane’ Daily Mail, 8 February 2007
Whilst this idea has fueled a securitization idea around face-veiling, the past year has seen this idea of threat extended to the idea that face-veiling is a form of or engine to radicalization. Janice Turner (5 July 2014) states in The Times:

“The veil is so much more than a garment or even a symbol of faith like the cross, yarmulke, turban or headscarf, whose British wearers live largely free from abuse. It is a Trojan horse for an extreme form of Wahhabi Islam that provokes western Muslims to rage against their non-Muslim compatriots rather than to co-exist in peace. The veil is both a means to banish women from public life and a tool for provoking social unrest.”

The face-veil and the act of face-veiling are in fact seen as violent threats to British society. This piece comes in response to Dr. Irene Zempi’s research into the experience of being face-veiled in the UK (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). Not only did Zempi and Chakraborti interview women who wore the niqab, Zempi dressed in a burqa for four weeks and presented her findings, which included being victimized and oppressed by non-Muslims. Zempi and Chakraborti outline in some detail the horrors of victimization, highlighting that part of this is the exclusion of the Muslim women who wear it from social spaces, thus fulfilling a concomitant function to the expulsion created by law that Razack discusses (2008) as allowing the Muslim subject, once expelled to be tortured and denied in ways that citizenship does not allow.

As Sayyid (2011) elaborates:

“The demand to erase the burqa is not an attempt to liberate oppressed women, but more likely an attempt to erase Muslim presence from public life. This erasure is perhaps couched in the language of public safety, combating cultural oppression of women and guaranteeing cultural integrity and civic peace, but what it is saying unambiguously is that Muslims should not be seen let alone heard. The irony of repressing something in the name of combating cultural oppression is too obvious.”

In this regard, there are distinct emotional harms associated with this victimization. Throughout interviews and focus group discussions conducted by Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) participants highlighted that they had low confidence and low self-esteem because of experiencing Islamophobia in public. They also pointed out that they were made to feel ‘worthless’, ‘unwanted’ and that they ‘didn’t belong’. For converts in particular, experiences of Islamophobic victimization often left them feeling confused and hurt, compounding their sense of isolation. Seen in this light, Islamophobic victimization disrupts notions of belonging whilst maintaining the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This highlights the immediate effect of Islamophobic victimization which is to undermine victims’ sense of security and belonging whilst the longer-term or cumulative impact is to create fear about living in a particular locality and to inspire a wish to move away (Bowling, 2009). In this way geographical spaces are created in which ‘others’ are made to feel unwelcome and vulnerable to attack, and from which they may eventually be excluded (Bowling, 2009 in Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014) Part of that exclusion comes from the exclusion of Muslim voices from the spaces of discourse.
Ameli et al (2004b) highlight how conversations around the face veil are considered to be part of a ‘common sense’ discussion that finds expression in newspaper columns whereby everyone can be an expert (even TV sports presenters) except Muslims. In the last few years, this narrative space has been extended to include Muslims who accept the extremes of the narrative.

Ameli and Merali (2006a) highlight how women who cover their hair are also made intensely vulnerable by the increasingly negative rhetoric. In the almost 10 years between this study and that of Chakraborty and Zempi (2014), it can be argued that the sense of vulnerability has turned into outright fearfulness, with major impacts on mental health and well-being, health and social mobility which need to be properly addressed.

Running parallel to this discourse is the idea of Muslim men as sexual predators and pedophiles and Muslim male perversion – child groomers, predators against vulnerable white women etc. – has been the staple of much media and political representation (Ameli and Merali, 2015). There have been repeated stories about Pakistani and Muslim men grooming children after a series of cases involving all or mainly Muslim and / or Pakistani men. It has been observed that no similar stories highlighting the ethnicity or religion of other perpetrators have been noted. Harker (22 July 2012) reflecting on the conviction of white male perpetrators of child abuse said:

“There was no commentary anywhere on how these crimes shine a light on British culture, or how middle aged white men have to confront the deep flaws in their religious and ethnic identity. Yet that's exactly what played out following the conviction in May of the "Asian sex gang" in Rochdale, which made the front page of every national newspaper. Though analysis of the case focused on how big a factor was race, religion and culture, the unreported story is of how politicians and the media have created a new racial scapegoat. In fact, if anyone wants to study how racism begins, and creeps into the consciousness of an entire nation, they need look no further.”

Harker further laments:

“While our media continue to exclude minority voices in general, such lazy racial generalizations are likely to continue. Even the story of a single Asian man acting alone in a sex case made the headlines. As in Derby this month, countless similar cases involving white men go unreported.”

“We have been here before, of course: in the 1950s, West Indian men were labelled pimps, luring innocent young white girls into prostitution. By the 1970s and 80s they were vilified as muggers and looters. And two years ago, Channel 4 ran stories, again based on a tiny set of data, claiming there was an endemic culture of gang rape in black communities. The victims weren't white, though, so media interest soon faded. It seems that these stories need to strike terror in the heart of white people for them to really take off.”
Whether by striking terror into the hearts of white people or not, there is now some critical reflection on the British establishment after the revelations of widespread child abuse in the wake of the inquiry into the late Jimmy Savile, and at the time of writing, allegations into widespread child abuse by senior political figures including former Prime Minister Edward Heath and ministers and peers including the late Leon Brittan and Lord Greville Janner. 

As Neale and Lindisfarne (March 2015) argue about the Oxford gang abuse case the “[G]reat majority of the men recently prosecuted for organised abuse of children and young people are nonwhite. These are a tiny minority of non-white men in the country.

Yet media headlines including those overtly connecting Muslim practitioners (Imams) with the promotion of grooming (inferred through religious praxis of sermons and instruction) like ‘Imams Promote Grooming Rings, Muslim leader claims’ (Dixon, 2013) have arguably been instrumental in the experiences of Asian taxi drivers in Rotherham who claim they are facing racist abuse from passengers on a daily basis. Cabbies in the town say they have been the target of bigots since the Jay Report into child sexual abuse by largely Pakistani men was published (Pitt, 22 October 2014), as well as a plethora of other experiences of Islamophobia, organized and intimidatory and spontaneous. This includes far-right mobilization e.g. hundreds of the far-right group ‘Britain First’ supporters marched through the center of Rotherham on two occasions after the publication of the Jay report. (Parry, 5 October, 2014 and Pitt, 5 October, 2014).

(vi) Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms

The markers of sub-humanity of Muslims are not particular to Muslims, and have been instrumentalized by negative policy discourse against various communities at different times. These include the ideas of Muslims as intrinsically violent, as lazy, as illiterate (either willfully or intrinsically), un-Enlightened (inherently so) and sexually deviant. 

David Cameron’s comments that Muslim women are traditionally submissive, that some cannot even speak English and that both these factors are tied to potential violence amongst their children is the culmination of a particular focus on Muslims as illiterate.

The idea of Muslim illiteracy as a self-inflicted cause of Muslim problems (that finds realization in the Casey Report) was raised by erstwhile Home Secretary Jack Straw at the time of the launch of the Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia in 1997. Straw not only did not recognize the problem, saying that he was unconvinced by the report, but he stated that he had good news for the Muslim community that day. This news had been widely anticipated by many present as the long overdue announcement that Muslim schools would be receiving state funding. The Home Secretary announced that he would be helping Muslims by maintaining the level of s.11 funding i.e. funding for teaching English as a second language. Again this posits Muslims as illiterate and therefore unable to participate in society as opposed to victims of Muslim specific discrimination and exclusion from society (Shadjareh and Merali, 2000).
Running alongside this policy narrative was the rise of the far-right in the political field, namely the revival of the British National Party (BNP) under the leadership of Nick Griffith. The party contested various elections and was able to secure some council seats in the late 1990s, an entirely new phenomenon in British politics whereby an avowedly far-right group, perceived to be racist, gained any type of electoral victory. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the BNP brought this idea to the fore in its campaigning material. It repeatedly announced that Muslims are a threat to British society. On the articles page of its website, it pasted an article called ‘Understanding Islam is our birthright,’ allegedly sent by an unnamed Sikh source.

It states:

“Most demonstrators, who set fire to the book at a public demonstration in Bradford a few years ago, shouting abuse at the author, were illiterate. They could not understand a word of English nor had seen a copy of the book before…”

“Compulsory Koran classes for Muslim children are a waste of time for most pupils at school who are forced to learn Arabic at the cost of learning Physics, English, Maths or Geography…”

It concludes:

“Islam, therefore, holds a world record in the number of VOLUNTARY killers and assassins on earth. Salman Rushdie is not the only one seeking safety from Islamic killers. The others have been killed promptly. None is living even to be protected!”

This section of articles on the BNP website reiterated its claim that it was “the only political party with the guts to tackle the Islamic question honestly and openly.” Dated September 29, 2001, this is mirrored on May 12, 2002 by The Sunday Times, which lauds Peter Hain MP, then Minister for Europe, sounding an ‘honest warning,’ and “sounding the alarm about Islamic asylum seekers who...refuse to adapt to Britain’s way of life, sometimes even refusing to learn English.”

Peter Hain’s ‘honest warning’ references the problems of ‘isolationist Muslims’ who can be exploited by Bin-Laden or other extremists. Once more the specter and stereotype of Muslims as illiterate is raised and associated with violence of an extreme nature. New citizenship tests in the early 2000s, added the obligation on new immigrants to learn English imposed by David Blunkett MP, the present Home Secretary, and we see an increasing association between Muslims and illiteracy, with a running sub-text of violence (Shadjareh and Merali, 2002).

The idea of Muslim ‘illiteracy’ as a long running cultural trope and the demonization of Muslim grievance at the time of the Rushdie Affair in 1988 – 89, continued to find reflection in these narratives. Thus Muslim illiteracy was not simply a matter of ingratitude or laziness or separatism on the part of Muslims with no desire to integrate but stems from a basic un- Enlightened nature. In this
discourse both Islam as an unreformed religion, and Muslims as essentially un-European (un-Enlightened) and un-European (ethnically) overlap. There is some tension between the idea that the Enlightenment values supposedly undergirding modern man are universal and the idea that Muslims are incapable of having them. In essence rather than undermining the idea of universality, in a discourse laden with this tension at the political and cultural level, it is the humanity of Muslims that is denied. The rise of the clash of civilizations theory espoused by Huntington (1996) only served to make this more explicit by locating Enlightenment values within Europe to be adopted by non-Europeans rather than being natural to them (Huntington, 1996 cited in Merali, 2000).

Whilst the BNP’s imagery was crude in its violent depiction of the ‘Islamic question’ ultimately post-Rushdie it took the underlying narrative of Muslim illiteracy as a self-inflicted / inherent trait.

Its latest incarnation in the narrative of Cameron or the educational policies of Gove reinforces the idea that Muslims (even in the case of the Birmingham schools seek to advance educational attainment) are incapable of raising (an acceptable) literacy. Khan, as described elsewhere identifies this as the projection of the idea of the rebellious slave and the heretical outsider (the witch), who can never be fully constituted as human in a Eurocentric framework (2014).

(vii) Muslims as segregationists

Muslims are posited as both gender segregationists internally, but crucially segregationist vis a vis issues of integration. This runs through ideas of Muslim no-go areas promulgated and platformed by both far-right groups but also figures such as Bishop Nazir Ali (Wynne-Jones, 2008 and Brown, 2009) and the Henry Jackson Society (Treptow and Stuart, 2015), despite regular debunking of the ideas that such areas exist.

The issue of dress, in particular but not solely the niqab has been a recurrent narrative that claims inter alia the idea of emotional separateness of Muslims. Raised in the mainstream by Jack Straw MP in 2006, the idea has recurred endlessly and been reinvented in many ways to indicate a desire for separateness. It has been reinvigorated in the snap General Election 2017 debate by the inclusion of a plan to ban it by the UK Independence Party. The party’s leader was given mainstream airtime to explain that in order to integrate, Muslim women must show their faces.

Likewise the desire for Muslim faith schools has been historically pathologized, despite the existence of faiths schools across religious spectra.

The above mirrors Ameli et al’s findings in 2005 and the idea amongst parents seeking faith education that a Muslim school environment helps create confident citizens. Yet the idea of Muslim educational space, both in terms of faith schools and as space within mainstream schooling has not only continued to be pilloried, it has also become a trope reproduced by law and policy makers as well as
in political and hostile media discourse. Repeated discussions around the idea of (self) segregation are usually unfounded, (see Billings and Holden, 2008 outlined below). Merali (2013), writing before Trojan Hoax, observes the continued obsession with the Muslim educational space nearly a decade after the research by Ameli et al (2005) was undertaken:

“... we find ourselves subsumed by a pernicious debate about Muslim schools (again), where government and opposition politicians jump over each other in attempts to placate an Islamophobic mob mentality over red herrings such as gender equality and discrimination, and the demonizing of the wearing of hijab as inimical to this. Whilst paying the same taxes as everyone else, it appears Muslims have no right to demand the type of schooling they want, and thus having to put up with whatever is on offer, often low on academic standards and institutionalised against diversity, or pay for private Muslim schools.”

Just as Progler (2008) identified recurring post-Enlightenment tropes in the depiction of Muslims in Anglophonic culture, Khan (2014) sees specific tropes come to the fore in the Trojan Hoax affair, which the authors here see reflected in the general narrative used in the run up to the enactment and implementation of the CTS Act, i.e. the slave and the witch.

“... The slave or the subordinate - the dangerous street mugger who threatens the law and order of society, a figure reflecting fear of rebellion and insurrection. This is the fear of the ghetto and the street. A fear of a Muslim physicality expressed through the language of self- segregation or segregated communities, espoused by Ted Cantle and Herman Ouseley a decade ago in a language now embedded in public policy. A body of people depicted as a congealed unmovable mass, unable to integrate or penetrate into wider society; allegedly a space whose counter values have been fostered by a multicultural egalitarianism that has compromised the cohesiveness and safety of Britain.”

“This is the Muslim imaginary space referred to by former New Labour Minister, Hazel Blears, as non-governed spaces, where notions of jihad are born, take shape and take action. It is a fear that creates ‘no go’ areas in people’s minds, a fear of Muslim ghettos that challenge the aspirational ‘Middle England’ and you can hear it echoed in both the rhetoric of the EDL and that of mainstream UK politicians. It is the fear expressed in the charge of ‘Muslimification’ of state schools as self-segregated institutions producing self-segregating young people and communities. A charge that interprets acts of demography as acts of ideology.

“... the Witch: a fear of the disguised, the hidden, and the stranger seeking vengeance or retribution. This fear exists in the breakdown of trust within a community or nation leading to it becoming divided against itself, neighbour suspecting neighbour, colleague suspecting colleague. One can see this here in state measures that place a duty on teachers, employers, colleagues, neighbours and families to look for signs of radicalisation in their colleagues, students or children. This form of Islamophobia conveys the fear of a hidden agenda, of an intelligence planning and designing...”
A persistent trope expressed even in the thinking of former race relations pundits is ‘sleepwalking into segregation’ (Phillips cited in the Guardian, 19 September 2005). However research is counter-intuitive and rather shows the locus of extremist White ideologies in enclaves of the ‘host’, as in the Burnley report (Billings and Holden, 2008). The report studied inter alia three schools (one mainly white, one mixed, one mainly Muslim) in the Burnley area with a view to looking at the negative impacts of enclavisation and how this may have contributed to the riots in Burnley in 2001. The authors however found that:

“The all-White school is unable by itself to overcome the entrenched White extremism that is mediated through the family, the peer group and the enclave. This strongly suggests that in towns with sizeable ethnic minorities, unless White young people are exposed during their school careers to fellow pupils of different ethnic and religious backgrounds, attitudes of White superiority and hostility towards those of other cultures are unlikely to be ameliorated and smouldering resentments will continue into adult life. Enclavisation, however, assists the development of liberal and integrative attitudes among young Asian/Muslim people by providing an oasis of liberality in a strong and cohesive sub-community.” (Billings and Holden, 2008: 4).

Later in the year a judge found that the Schools Inspectorate Oftsed’s claim that the schools targeted by its actions were discriminating against women by imposing gender segregation in school was incorrect and that no legal breach had taken place. The judge stated that there was no evidence that gender segregation disadvantages women, and that further as both sexes were denied interaction there was no disadvantage to one over the other. This did not however translate into a major revision of the narrative against either the Trojan Horse teachers and schools, or the trope in general that Muslims push gender segregation as a way to disadvantage Muslim women. Indeed the stigma of being a student from a Trojan Horse school surfaced in 2016 in an employment discrimination case. A Muslim teaching assistant sacked after objecting to children being shown a graphic video of the 9/11 horrors found that that staff had raised concerns about her background, mentioning her position of Head Girl at Saltley School - one of the schools implicated in the ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal.

(viii) Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

Nevertheless, the trope of a segregationist anti-integration Muslim society within British society continued to find expression in media and political discourse, leading to policy interventions that fuel the cycle of negative discourse.

The launch of the Casey Review into Integration and Opportunity in December 2016 supposedly looked at the challenges faced by communities. It was widely lauded by UKIP, some government ministers and politicians, and various parts of the commentariat. However it was also deeply criticized for methodological failings, and an obsession with Islam and Muslims, with the word Muslim used 249 times in a 200 page report (with the Polish community mentioned only 12 times), and Islam mentioned over 100 times. Many critics said it was likely to worsen community relations.
The report summarized a shift in political discourse regarding social mores generally, which has instrumentalized Islamophobic rhetoric and tropes to legitimize a move away from the idea of government responsibility vis-à-vis social issues like poverty, disadvantage and racism. Thus the rhetoric of the Casey Review echoed tropes about Muslims and minorities who suffer disadvantage in employment as bearing the responsibility for this by not integrating (enough). The impact of racism on such disadvantage or social and economic factors relating to class or regional disadvantages is entirely overlooked, and even portrayed as fictitious.

Although many similar cases can be cited, there is enough from senior governmental figures to keep us occupied. David Cameron’s speech in Munich in 2011, attacking ‘Islamist extremism’, proposed among other things a litmus test for engaging with Muslim organizations:

“So let’s properly judge these organisations: Do they believe in universal human rights– Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separatism? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations. No public money. No sharing of platforms with Ministers at home. At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly funded institutions – like universities and prisons.”

The internal conflict between the idea of organizing participating in civil society, be it at university or providing chaplaincy services, with the idea that they are still not integrated furthers the promulgation of the idea of differential citizenship for Muslims. They cannot take part in political and social processes for fear of being charged with ‘entryism’ and even ‘extremism’, but at the same time they are deemed to be separatist and that this failure to ‘integrate’ is in fact the cause of the disadvantage they face, rather than external factors such as racism, state or social discrimination, class or economic factors.

Part of that narrative also charges Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism, and therefore minority privilege and the undermining of equality and social cohesion and attacking British identity and privilege.

This attack on the idea of failed integration runs concurrent to the public disavowal by various governments since the mid-2000s to the idea and praxis of multiculturalism. Whilst Cameron is credited with a full break from the term, calling instead for ‘muscular liberalism’ and ‘social cohesion’, it is Blair’s speech known as the ‘Rules of the Game’ speech that set the scene for the retreat from this praxis. Whilst multiculturalism was a contested idea, even amongst minority communities its detractors stated it favored, the concept understood the operation of structural and institutionalized forms of racism. This understanding led in the 1960s and 1970s to the creation of new bodies to help foster integration, and to laws that outlawed discrimination such as the Race Relations Act (1966, amended 1976). The idea and its outcomes were a de facto acknowledgement that institutions (schools, workplaces and by extension all institutions of the state) are obliged to protect ethnic
minorities from discrimination. The operation of racism within structures is acknowledged at the very least, and the idea of institutional racism (as concretized later by the Macpherson Report 1999) exists therein. The drive for integration, whilst focusing on the need to socialize immigrant cultures to the state, acknowledged that the state’s relations with its ethnic communities was problematic and in need of change.

With the demonization and oftentimes pathologization of Muslims has come a call for the end of multicultural ideas and practice from voices within the political establishment and the commentariat. Using the idea that these practices have somehow favored Muslims, the roll-back from the idea of multiculturalism has a twofold effect (i) to mark out Muslims as receiving undeserved privileges from the state; (ii) to remove the responsibility of the state for dealing with issues like racism, and to retreat from the idea that government and institutions are racist.

This idea of privileging Muslims cuts across social landscapes, and can be found e.g. in discussions about culture and cultural institutions. In January 2010, the acclaimed and popular screenwriter Lynda La Plante was quoted bemoaning the BBC’s commissioning practices. La Plante, whose many TV dramas like Prime Suspect have had primetime slots over many decades on mainstream British channels stated that the BBC would rather read a script by a “little Muslim boy,” than one she had written implying that there was in fact preferential treatment for Muslims. She continued, “If my name were Usafi Iqbadal and I was 19, then they’d probably bring me in and talk...” (Midgeley, 2 January 2010). In using the name Usafi Iqbadal (neither of which have an actual provenance in Muslim heritage languages) she reverts to an age old racist practice. Whilst the story was covered, there was little revulsion.

Further the expression of mother tongues or community languages in the public sphere is associated with the critique of not speaking English. This critique comes not simply from far-right campaigns or commentary but has been expressed by the former head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Trevor Phillips (2016) with regard to the prominence of Polish shops and signage on British High Streets. Thus the legitimization of angst against language, by way of the idea of Muslim separatism has resulted in a blanket demonization of ‘immigrants’. It is notable that after the Brexit vote, the spike in hate crimes against various ‘minoritized’ groups saw attacks, including a murder, undertaken because someone was heard speaking another language (Krupa, 2016).

The Telegraph (Midgeley, 2 January 2010) reported the story in terms of a discussion about the values of the BBC and a more general critique of its commissioning practices. The implication was that new commissioning editors have exceeded the corporation’s remit (as highlighted by the critique of another author, P.D. James) with regard to the quality of its programs (she spoke of dog themed entertainment shows and made no reference to ethnicity or religion) and programs which are by implication mindful of trends rather than focusing on British classics and classical programming e.g. shows like Pride and Prejudice (a critique cited from Andrew Davies, another well-known scriptwriter). La Plante’s criticisms are then attached to unrelated critiques and legitimized. By doing
so, in this article, they also attach a sense of cheapness to the idea of Muslim creativity (akin to shows on dog training) and undermining of British classics (like the very famous adaptations of Andrew Davies), as well as mooting the idea of misplaced favoritism for Muslims which discriminates against a beloved elderly screenwriter i.e. La Plante.

This article and incident speaks to an idea of failure of multiculturalism resting not in the failure of Muslims to integrate, but that Muslims are undeserving of integration into (in this case) the cultural fabric of the nation.

Even before 9-11, the reportage of Muslims had been identified ‘as exoticism, fanaticism, and delinquency’ (Brown, 2007). Poole (2011) analyzed hundreds of articles from British newspapers over three years before 9-11 and identified the following themes: Muslims’ involvement in deviant activities that threaten national security; Muslims as a threat to British values provoking integrative concerns; the idea of inherent cultural difference between Muslims and the majority; and Muslims increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere. These themes are illustrated further by examining the dominant topics of coverage: politics; criminality; relationships; education and fundamentalism.

Poole (2011) further highlights (citing Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008)), that such coverage has come to the forefront again as the threat of terrorist attacks declined after 7/7. It can be argued that this cycle repeats as and when attacks happen. However, Poole further argues that despite the shifts in the type of stories, the core message remains the same since before 9-11 with the idea that ‘we’ the British have been too tolerant of them, the Muslims, who have sought to impose their way of life on us. She highlights the link between this type of coverage, the legacy of New Labour’s integrationist / assimilationist project and David Cameron’s Munich speech blaming multiculturalism for Islamic extremism (due to minority separatism). Cameron’s speech, as Poole notes, is seen as more symbolic in that it set out a test for “extremism” on the day the English Defence League staged an anti-Islamic march in Luton, UK (Ameli and Merali, 2010).

(ix) Immigration and the demographic threat

Immigration as demonized discourse in the UK can be traced back several decades. Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in the 1960s and Margaret Thatcher’s concerns about immigrants ‘swamping’ the UK are well known and documented. Immigration has remained a contentious political issue, and successive governments of whatever hue and most parts of the public intellectual and media punditry have taken umbrage with the idea of the UK as the destination for large numbers of ‘foreigners’. In the 1950s - 1970s the marking out of immigrant communities as problematic was largely based on biological racism and the marking out of ‘national’ cultures. Anti-Muslim / Islamophobic specificity in various discourses arose in two distinct scenarios: the idea of second and third generations of British citizens who were also Muslim and could not be targeted as the first generation as ‘immigrants; and those who arrived as asylum seekers and refugees in the 1990s and onwards. Thus, having hitherto been known as a locus for political dissidents fleeing persecution
elsewhere in the world, London found itself targeted in much discourse as a home for ‘extremist’ Muslims accused of taking benefits from the state and by implication taking benefits to the detriment of ‘host’ communities.

The ‘Islamisation’ of immigration is a factor that has had significant impact, and is arguably one of the factors that led to the ‘Leave’ win in the EU referendum of 2016.

The campaign for the Leave group in the EU Referendum held on 23 June was also accused of instrumentalizing Islamophobia both as a trope against Muslims already in the UK, as well as raising the specter of increased Muslim immigration by remaining within the EU. Two pieces of advertising for the Leave campaign came in for particular criticism. A poster unveiled by UKIP leader Nigel Farage two weeks before the referendum featured a line of what appeared to be Syrian migrants in Europe. The picture, an actual piece of reportage from the so-called migrant crisis, was captioned: “Breaking point: the EU has failed us all.”

This came less than four weeks after the poster for the Leave campaign entitled “Turkey (a country of 76 million) is joining the EU: Vote Leave.” (Figure 2) The poster was accompanied by comments from the campaign stating:

“Since the birthrate in Turkey is so high, we can expect to see an additional million people added to the UK population from Turkey alone within eight years. This will not only increase the strain on Britain’s public services, but it will also create a number of threats to UK security. Crime is far higher in Turkey than the UK. Gun ownership is also more widespread. Because of the EU’s free movement laws, the government will not be able to exclude Turkish criminals from entering the UK.”

Arabella Arkwright, a businesswoman who sat on the board and finance committee of Vote Leave, was forced to resign after details of her Twitter activities were exposed in the media. They included an image of a white girl in the middle of a group of people wearing burqas saying: “Britain 2050: why didn’t you stop them Granddad?” and a link from Tommy Robinson, the founder of the far right English Defence League, suggesting UK Muslims were trying to build an Islamic state in Britain. The fact that such a high-ranking member of the Leave campaign had chosen to engage publicly in such repugnantly Islamophobic chatter is illustrative of what Ameli and Merali described as the environment of hate that governs the perception and treatment of minorities.

(x) Muslim spaces as incubators

Mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools or Muslim majority schools, madrasas, shariah councils, cemeteries and potential Islamic spaces have been frequent targets of hate crimes. Conceptually however they have also been targeted by government, media and legislative oversight as spaces that incubate all of the foregoing tropes.
The violation of Muslim spaces, in particular mosques and schools, speaks to the idea of being able to ‘touch’ in this case Muslim space, in the name of desegregation. In actuality it serves to reinforce expulsion because it also denies the legitimacy of identity and violates the psychological sanctity of the community targeted.

The thematics of the symbolic attacks and incidents again show the breaking of bonds of empathy and shared citizenship. The continued attacks on the idea of multiculturalism from political discourse in particular, makes multiple non-majority spaces vulnerable. The replacement discourse of social cohesion, which places responsibilities on minorities to integrate and desist from separation, only serves to emphasize that community-specific places like mosques are a mark of separation.

As Khan describes:

“discourses surrounding community cohesion set the stage for the acceptance of Islamophobic measures in public and political spheres promoted by PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] and associated counter terrorism initiatives. As a consequence negative, reductive and stereotypical constructs have been played out to represent Muslims as ‘something of a congealed mass, both impenetrable and inassimilable’ “(Khan 2010, 86).

Such depictions both reinforce and escalate fears about the Muslim ‘other’ whereby all Muslims come to embody a ‘danger,’ even young Muslim children in primary schools” (Sian, 2013: 7-8).

The idea of separateness is also tied in to the material and thinking of groups such as Britain First who have staged a number of mosque invasions in the last year. These typically involve entering mosques wearing shoes, distributing bibles, calling on worshippers to integrate into society and condemning women only spaces as ‘sexist’.

The visibility of Muslim symbols like mosques, is also often interpreted as a sign of takeover. The long-running idea that Muslims in the public space are problematic as expressed before 9-11 (Poole, 2011), has turned into arguments of entryism and takeover of public life (Ameli and Merali, 2015).

Muslim charities, have also been systematically singled out for scrutiny by the Charity Commission (the oversight body for UK charities). According to Bodi (2016) the failure of Kids Company, a charity that had high level political patronage, but failed without it seemed even the slightest basic oversight by the Commission, was further evidence of the partiality of the Commission, which had evidenced an obsessive focus on Muslim charities. Bodi highlights the treatment of Interpal and Muslim Aid both investigated, spuriously as it turned out, and repeatedly in the case of Interpal for allegedly having links with terrorist organizations. On all counts both charities were cleared and the claims, oftentimes made in the press, proven to be wholly unsubstantiated. Since the appointment of William Shawcross as the Chair of the Commission, according to Bodi, the focus on Muslim charities accelerated.
The appointment of Shawcross, vetted by relevant parliamentary committees, signified a serious shift in discourse. Avowedly anti-Islam, Shawcross resigned his position at the neo-conservative think tank the Henry Jackson Society to take up the role. Whilst at HJS, Shawcross was quoted as saying: "Europe and Islam is one of the greatest, most terrifying problems of our future...." It was revealed that after Shawcross was post, the Commission implemented a new code called 'extremism and radicalisation'. Claystone revealed that the Commission had marked 55 charities with the issue code ‘extremism and radicalisation’ without their knowledge in the period 5 December 2012 to 8 May 2014. These charities were being monitored as a potential concern for matters relating to extremism and radicalization. According to Claystone, there are no written criteria for applying or removing this label and thus it lends itself to non-evidence based targeting of particular groups (Bodi, 2016).

IHRC (2014) had previously argued that Commission’s new powers would green light further harassment of Muslim organizations.

Given the government’s definition of extremism incorporates an ever latitudinous range of beliefs and behavior, it will allow the Commission to target a larger number of charities, simply on account of the religious and/or political beliefs they or their partner organizations appear to hold. According to IHRC:

“The government has turned the Charity Commission into a principal enforcement agent of its much-berated PREVENT programme, designed to combat religious and political extremism in the UK. The recent appointment by the Cabinet Office of Peter Clarke to the board of the Charity Commission underlines this transformation of the Charity Commission from an oversight agency into an instrument of repression against British Muslims.”

6. Conclusion

The nature and illogic of anti-Muslim narratives is as such that many overlap despite (or indeed because of) their internal contradictions. It becomes difficult then to classify narratives in a discrete order of severity. Nevertheless it is clear that some of these discourses have eclipsed others in their pervasiveness and impact.

The following narratives coalesce to create the justification for the creation and perpetuation of laws and policies that extend almost entirely Muslim specific policing and legal regimes, including mass surveillance, profiling, laws that in effect target mainly the Muslim communities in the UK, and a wider discourse of aberrant and deviant Muslim subjectivity:

- Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)
- Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy
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- Islam as a counter to 'Britishness' / 'Fundamental British Values'
- Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

These four narratives hold up the basis for all anti-terrorism laws, regardless of efficacy (Merali, 2017a). The ten narratives are subsumed (with some cross over) between these four overarching themes, listed in order of prominence and impact.

- Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)

Whilst the idea of Muslims as ‘extremist’ is of relevance to these narratives, it is inferred in all the above. Its importance as a stand-alone narrative currently rests on whether or not the proposed Extremism Bill becomes law, thus giving a legal meaning to ‘extremism’ as opposed to its current status as a derogatory term and basis in media and political discourse for exclusion of the Muslim subject from equality before the law (Razack, 2008 and Merali, 2013).

Of similar significance is the trope of Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman. This carries with it now the subtext of violence, having been attached to the idea of male radicalization both by dint of raising radicalized sons as a result of their inability to communicate with them (Cameron, 2016), and by being themselves beacons of radicalization and cause of social unrest (Turner, 2014).

Whilst the narrative of Muslims as segregationists is connected to Muslims failing or not wanting to integrate, the failure to integrate narrative has moved beyond the idea of Muslims as living separate lives. The narrative that has gained more currency is that of entryism and the idea that Muslims trying to integrate or to have positions in society or mobilize on social issues is a form of threat.

Suspicion and denigration of Muslims spaces is framed (regardless of the space, be it a mosque, school or the practice of veiling) as inherently threatening and in need of regulatory law, praxis and discourse. The focus on mosques prevailed in large part in the mid-2000s with policy focused on surveilling mosques, as well as many opinion pieces and political speeches about the idea of the radical imam and his radicalized congregations. Whilst the impact of the discourse continues, not least by the policies of the Charity Commission under William Shawcross, it is no longer the main focus. Likewise, an obsession with Muslim schools in the political imaginary that characterized many Muslim related discussions in the early 2000s (Ameli, et al., 2005) has been subsumed by the idea of Muslims in public institutions including students and teachers and governors in mainstream schools.

The idea of segregationism, based on the idea of Muslims spaces crosses over here with the overarching narrative of the 'need for Muslims to integrate'.

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• Disloyalty and the threat to internal democracy

This and the other narratives also feed into the narrative of Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism, and are used as evidence of the failure of and indeed the lack of credibility of the multicultural settlement. This narrative had precedence over many other in the mid-2000s to the start of the ConDem coalition, when David Cameron finally ended all claims of the state to foster such an ethos, declaring instead that it was time for a ‘muscular liberalism’ (2011). Arguably, the collapse of the idea of Muslims as citizens and the idea of the Britishness of the majority versus the culture(s) of immigrants (be they Muslim, Eastern European or other) has resulted in an unattainable Britishness, despite claims that the adoption of liberal mores is all that is needed for victimized ethnic and / or religious groups to end their victimization.

The rise of the obsession regarding entryism highlights the extent to which the Muslim ability to project themselves into the future has taken hold, whereby Muslim aspirations based on pre-existing praxis amongst the majority is seen, not as (deferential) emulation and evidence of integration but as something other, by virtue of its Muslimness.

The Brexit campaign exhibited a complete capitulation to far-right narratives of yesteryear, and right-wing commentariat claims (Murray, 2013 2014) about the Muslim demographic time bomb, with the possible accession of Turkey to the EU highlighted as a threat to the UK (Merali, 2017b).

• Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’

The idea that Muslims are subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms has gained currency within civil society and caused a schism in programs to combat Islamophobia by accepting the premise that (if) some Muslim practices are beyond the pale, there must be a form of rejection of such practices and beliefs on the part of Muslims before a recognition of and redress for Islamophobia can come about. Thus the expectations of Muslims from the government is beset with a conditionality in a way no other citizen, be they from a minoritized community or the majority community is required to hold. The locus of this problem at the level of civil society is arguably the result of a trickle down of the narrative in particular from the time of the Rushdie Affair until the early 2000s when opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was often characterized as not just disloyalty but particularly a sign of Muslim recalcitrance for their more reprehensible beliefs. Thus opposition to the wars, if expressed by Muslims was deemed to be support for the Taliban and Bin Laden.

• Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)

Whilst the separatist / segregationist narrative still exists (an crosses over with the overarching narrative of security), it has more significance as a trope in far-right mobilization where the idea of physical segregation in terms of veiling, Muslim spaces (i.e. mosques, schools etc.) is deemed
aberrant and in need of redress if necessary as a result of mobilization of the majority to attack those expressions of separateness. Whilst the majority of hate crimes are usually perpetrated by individuals with no group affiliations (Ameli et al., 2011), there has clearly been a rise in far-right mobilizations against such spaces. This includes marches through supposedly Muslim majority areas e.g. various EDL marches in Luton; mosque invasions by Britain First particularly in 2014; continued attacks on Muslim women who wear clothing identified as Muslim, including but not solely face veils and headscarves (Ameli and Merali, 2015, Zempi and Chakroborti, 2014).

It can be argued that those narratives that fuel securitization policy and discourse and those that critique the potentiality and possibility of the Muslim subject in the public space as entryists etc., currently hold the most sway as anti-Muslim narratives. The impact of this is seen and felt by Muslims whose faith in the political process appears to have collapsed between the period of 2011 and 2014 (Ameli and Merali, 2015). The latter narrative has highlighted to many Muslims surveyed by the authors that they feel targeted by media and political institutions, which in their understanding contribute heavily towards a deteriorating climate of fear, a rise in support for far-right groups and a rise of anti-Muslim racism per se. As a result they feel pressured to modify their behavior and in some instances feel that this is the deliberate goal of government and the political classes. This latter feeling is something more evident in 2014 than it was in 2010, when the operation of institutional (and what was understood to be often ignorant) reproduction of stereotypes by the media was seen to be the primary cause of an anti-Muslim culture (Ameli and Merali, 2015). In response to the qualitative question about whether negative experiences had caused behavior modification, most Muslims answered affirmatively. Various examples of the types of change were given and included acts that effectively reduced or erased Muslim visibility, as individuals, but also as a community of confession, or as individual actors or groupings in political and civil society arenas. The political pressures are seen as a way to socially engineer the acceptance of a depoliticized and secular ‘Islam’ amongst Muslims in the UK. The expectations for Muslims to hide their beliefs and views is a form of violence and bodes ill for the future (Ameli and Merali, 2015).
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