

Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Comparative Report

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Working Paper 3

Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

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
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Counter-Islamophobia Kit



Centre for Ethnicity & Racism Studies

About the CIK Project

The *Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States* (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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1. Introduction

This research report results from the comparative analysis of the country reports completed by each project partner to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and the United Kingdom. To this aim, the country reports are first briefly presented the body of literature spread locally about Islamophobia by taking into account institutions, scholars and associations; they also introduced some overall information about Muslims in the considered country at the socio-demographic level, pointing out the main forms of participation as well. Then, narratives of hatred were studied through contextualizing them in discursive environments which are not neutral and which impact the ways in which anti-Muslim attacks deploy. A diachronic perspective facilitated the identification of some significant temporal points marking the development of these narratives.

In this report, the data collected in each country will not be systematically examined, but rather synthesised to suggest a holistic reasoning on the prevailing narratives of Muslim hatred in Europe on the basis of situated examples and of their meta-analysis. To do that, we will first briefly introduce the methodology adopted to gather data. We will then comparatively analyse the theatres (Sayyid, 2014) in which narratives are deployed. Finally, we will focus on hatred discourses, their recurrence and their relative relevance.

2. Methodology

The methodology chosen by each partner to address the concerned issues has been identified and implemented in relation to the visibility in the country not only of Islamophobia but also of Muslim communities themselves. In fact, even if the quantitative assessment of people and facts that are here under study does not impact the strength and spread of Islamophobia in each country, it seems to affect its emergence in the public discourse. In those countries where such visibility is attested (Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom), it has been possible to trace a detailed overview of the considered context and to identify respective narratives of hatred mainly on the basis of review of material from academic and political debates, and civil society organizations' reports, and of the analysis of data collected through "impregnation" in the question and in the field (De Sardan, 1995)¹. In those other countries where these issues are less visible (the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal), the choice of the authors has been to adopt systematic and structured analysis of discursive contents in order to obtain relevant results. These contents have been gathered through: selecting a corpus of texts including articles published in the local press, newspapers, websites, blogs and Facebook pages; media-monitoring work (including the analysis of television debates) and referencing of digital resources; identifying a catalogue of frames (frame discovery) and producing a frame analysis (this specifically concerns Hungary).

This report draws on the results obtained from this multi-method strategy and a comparison between the obtained results provides a rich qualitative account of the general discourse and its spread in Europe on (and against) Muslims and Islam by shedding light on convergences and divergences, on common trends and local specificities. The main project objective here is to elaborate the main narratives of hatred as a basis for evaluating narratives and actions expected to counter these messages of hate. The use of different methodologies in each country report did not undermine this aim; nevertheless, it engendered some constraints and the consequent need for making analytical choices to proceed with

¹ De Sardan uses this concept to describe the researcher's capacity, in particular while doing participant observation, to collect relevant data without systematic enquiry and through, instead, being immersed in the context under study. Data are "registered" through making oneself instinctively receptive to and familiar with the dynamics occurring within the field.

the meta-analysis. This relates in particular to the impossibility of systematically taking into account the different spheres and actors that are specifically concerned by each narrative that has been contextually analysed². The reason also lies in the emergence of different types of overlaps – in terms of actors, locations, effects and thematic concerns – of the studied narratives. The attempt within this meta-analysis has been to approach each of them as significant both in its multiple interlocks with the others and in its autonomous existence (which is possible probably only at an analytical level or in relation to temporal contextualization – one narrative may appear suddenly and apparently disconnected from the others in a precise spatial and temporal context). This analytical shift from narratives as interlocked discourses to narratives as standing alone messages and vice versa lies under both the qualitative comparison and the quantitative ranking. The meta-analysis that is shaped on this basis privileges some overlaps over other possible in reason of the contextual data available for each narrative considered and of its articulation with the overall information collected. That is why this comparative report does not claim to be exhaustive, but rather to propose a possible and effective – in terms of the identification of diffused message throughout the countries considered and of common trends at the European level – comparative reading of the issues described in the country reports.

3. Theatres

According to Sayyid's typologies of "theatres" describing the Muslim presence in a state, we can define the studied countries as "territories where Muslims are represented mainly as immigrants" (Sayyid, 2014: 64-65). The history and the quantitative terms of this representation differ among states. However, in all of them, though some official documents or past events permit us to account for the first relatively important numbers of people coming from mainly Muslim countries, we encounter similar difficulties in establishing precise estimations about the contemporary situation. The political scope as well as the methodological bias associated to such counting affect the production of figures. As self-declaration of religious belonging is not possible in demographic data collections within all states (this only happens – at times coupled with ethnic and racial self-declaration – in the United Kingdom and Hungary³), estimations are mainly based on counting people with a migration background linked to countries with a Muslim majority who are documented in the country at issue. These estimations are often instrumental in serving political aims, as we will see later. Considering these factors, we can suggest to approach the studied countries as theatres where figures about Muslims' presence produced at the level of the hegemonic discourse amounts to maximum 5% of the overall population (Hungary with less than 0.5%, Czech Republic and Portugal with less than 1%, the United Kingdom with between 4 and 5%) and theatres where these estimations exceed this percent (France with around 6%, Germany with less than 6%, Greece with 5.3%, Belgium with around 6%). An interesting element emerging from the reports with regard to figures of Muslims is the fact that they are generally associated with ethnic minority groups distinct from the majority population – and this entails differential and incomplete forms of citizenship – which makes narratives of hatred articulate in relation to discourses and policies developed on the one hand about migrants in more general terms, and on the other hand about other specific communities. As an example of the first case in point, we can mention the 2006 new test for acquiring citizenship introduced in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg in Germany later labelled the "Muslim test". Through disputable questions, this examination targeted Muslim migrants to assess their potential latent dangerousness – and to confirm their ontological difference with nationals, a fact which detrimentally influenced the access to citizenship⁴. Also in France, discourses on migration interlock with discourses

² These spheres and actors are not necessarily clearly and univocally identifiable in each report, in particular for those countries where the analysis of discourses of Muslim hatred has not been realized through the structured collection of precise political or media messages.

³ The religious identification is optional in the Czech census – and people might be reluctant to declare their religion – and in Portugal.

⁴ Similarly in the early 2000s in the United Kingdom new citizenship tests added the obligation on new immigrants to learn English imposed by David Blunkett MP, the present Home Secretary, and this triggered an increasing

on Muslims for example in relation to the issue of the *banlieues*, a discursive framework within which the young suburban populations (mainly African and Muslim) were viewed through the prism of the widely publicised urban violence occurring in these sites (suburban ghettos)⁵. Political discourse on suburbs became progressively framed as a debate about immigrant youth including the trope of “the failures of French integration” (INA 2003) and it increasingly incorporated a focus on Muslim youth. Recently, this focus was nourished by combining discourses on domestic security and delinquency with counter-terrorism (Cesari, 2001), in particular after the analogy between Islamic fundamentalism and the suburbs was made.

In some other contexts, the discriminating discourses associated to a minority group may be translated to Muslims, in name of general discursive representations based around the ontological and temporal distinction between host and immigrant (Hesse and Sayyid 2006). In the Czech Republic, where the anti-Roma narrative is regarded as universally shared and entrenched, Gypsies and Muslims are actually blamed for equal emblematic tropes that would concern them, such as the inadaptability of people – and their lack of integration in the local society –, illiteracy and low IQ, instinctively driven behaviour, unemployment, high fertility, high criminality, misuse of social benefits, and ghetto living. The comparison with Roma can also function differently as it is the case in Portugal, where despite similar size, Muslims – generally more privileged in socioeconomic status – are not the focus of policy intervention, while the Roma are seen as required to be closely monitored by the state (in terms of school attendance, professional training or *social inclusion*). Another emblematic example of this articulation of discourses around minorities concerns again Germany, where “the horror of any form of anti-Semitism can blind people to new and different forms of racism” (Schiffer and Wagner 2011: 77) and lead to minimize or even ignore racial violence against – among others – Muslims. Connected to this, one of the discriminating discourses associated to Muslims in some countries is the accusation of anti-Semitism that also takes the form (in the Czech Republic for example) of the description of the threat of a possible “super-Holocaust” that would be carried out by Muslim terrorists.

Concerning the history of migration of people with a supposedly Muslim background, besides recalling significant historical events which marked it such as bilateral work agreements set between European countries and non-European countries with a Muslim majority (this is the case for Belgium, for example, which signed such an agreement with Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia), we deem it worth considering whether the state in question has or does not have colonial links with Muslim countries from which most of their Muslim immigrants come. This factor influences the formation, shapes and deployment of narratives of Muslim hatred. Already at the beginning of the 20th century in France, where Islamophobia is particularly associated with the colonial and migration history of the state – and this fact neglects Sub-Saharan Muslims and converts possibly being targets of anti-Muslim hatred and conflates ethnic origins with religious affiliation – this notion was defined as “a principle of administration of indigenous territories” (Delafosse, 1910). Later dynamics linked in particular to France colonial history in Algeria impacted the shaping of Islamophobia targeting Muslims with a migrant background and representing them first as “enemies within” due to their double allegiance, and only later as “outside enemies” in connection with global conflicts and crisis. In the British context, the role of the United Kingdom in the transatlantic slave trade and then the later colonization enterprises provide a context for a sustained narrative of Muslims first as subaltern and then as inherently inimical – thus triggering specific control policies to ensure the colonization program.

Although in Portugal such narratives are also present – mainly by evoking the foundation of the nation and the *Reconquista* against the *Moors* (see Vakil, 2003), discourses that claim that Portuguese had a *benevolent* colonialism contribute to sustain the self-declared imaginary of a multiracial, multicontinental and multireligious nation thus undermining the proper reporting of hatred against Islam and Muslims in

association between Muslims and illiteracy (a narrative already spread in the country), with a running sub-text of violence (Shadjareh and Merali, 2002).

⁵ This process also triggers – not only in France – the diffusion of ideas of “Muslim no-go areas”.

name of the supposed historical vocation of the country for interculturality and non-discrimination (Castelo, 1998).

Other historical relationships between certain countries of residence and certain countries of origin of Muslim migrants or with migrant background that are not necessarily associated with overt colonial and post-colonial concerns, may also impact the formation and deployment of narratives of Muslim hatred. In Greece, hostility against Turkey is a lingering feature of right-wing discourse that is smoothly intertwined with Islamophobic narratives. Even if this appeal to history is not a distinctive feature of such narratives in the Greek case, it is indeed effective in their contemporary shaping around new tropes that we will recall below. Concerning Hungary, the Turkish occupation of the country had among its consequences the settlement of an important tradition of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies from the 19th and 20th century which is different from its Western counterparts and this contributed to diplomatic and trade relations with the Muslim world. During the communist era, strong political and economic relations were built with some Middle East countries, even if after the transition, these ties were loosened (Pall and Sayfo, 2016; Sereghy, 2017). Despite the historic ties, there is no sizeable immigrant and Muslim population in Hungary. Generally, ethnically, culturally and religiously different migrants are small in number only, are not visible and do not make much impact on the everyday interactions of people and Islamophobia or the presence of Islamophobic narratives in the Hungarian context is a very recent phenomenon. Finally, in the Czech Republic, a strategic partner for the communist governments of Middle East and Northern Africa functioning as a vehicle of Soviet influence, historical relationships with mainly Muslim countries are essentially built on the political orientation of the country and they determined substantial migration waves. Indeed, this process did not trigger specific discourses on Muslims and Islam, and narratives of hatred only appeared in connection with very recent events, as we will see below.

The historical course of Muslim migration and of their presence in the considered state together with the state general approach to religious issues⁶ determine the definition of the official place of Islam in the society. Recognition – where it occurs – may vary from the possibility for other confessions than Catholicism to organise and provide students with religious education (as in Portugal⁷) to the identification of Islam among the official religions of the state, as for Belgium. In the latter case, but not only, the establishment of a Muslim institution to function as centralized interlocutor with the State seems unavoidable and interesting dynamics are recalled as being at play in dealing with issues of representativeness. In Belgium, institutional discourses and policies around integration played a crucial role in the establishment of the *Executif des Musulmans de Belgique*, the official body representing Muslims whose creation and election of representatives has been solicited by the state despite the fact that Belgian constitution refrains from intervening in the internal organization of worship places and assemblies. In Germany, where unlike Belgium Islam is not among the recognized religions of the country, similar dynamics occurred with the creation of the German Islam Conference (DIK), whose representatives were selected by the Minister of the Interior significantly excluding – among other actors – Muslim women wearing headscarves from the forum and discussion (Shooman 2010; Hernandez Aguilar 2015). Thus, besides responding to the declared urgent role of defining an intermediary between the state and Muslim communities, the establishment of a Muslim representative body also seems to be moved by aims of normalization, disciplining and co-option of Muslims, through mechanisms of control and regulation of their process of incorporation in the local society (the French case with the *Conseil français du culte musulman* is also an emblematic example of this process). This social engineering program is also developed in states – such as in the United Kingdom – where some independent bodies

⁶ For example, France's founding principle called "republican universalism" echoed among other measures by the 1905 law on the separation of church and state shapes the state accommodation of the religious needs of Muslim populations and their effective political representation (Maussen, 2007:10).

⁷ Indeed this possibility is rarely actualized because of the geographical dispersion of Muslims on the territory and the need for a minimum number of ten people to demand a class.

were established, but where their voice underwent a de-legitimation process in name of alleged dangerous connections and influence of external forces.

Within the framework of these described theatres, Islamophobia is conceptualized – where this occurs⁸ – in different forms and at different levels of the society, which influences whether systematic accounts for this form of discrimination exist or not. Often, debates around the legitimacy and practical scope of this term – that etymologically focuses on the notion of fear – are controversial, and they are shaped as a “battle of concepts” where one may prevail on the other. This is the case for Germany and its *Muslimfeindlichkeit* and *Islamfeindlichkeit*, conceptualising the hostility against Muslims and Islam based on the word defining xenophobia. In the Czech Republic, competing concepts are: Islamoscepticism, Islamocriticism, anti-Islamism, anti-Islamist politic, anti-Muslim hatred, to cite another country example among others⁹. Data on Islamophobia, when not retrievable directly, may also be inferred through the analysis of reports on discrimination undergone by migrants in more general terms or by Muslims but without offering a systematic account of the workings of Islamophobia¹⁰. Within these reports, the religious factor – more often coupled with the ethnic one – may emerge indirectly as one among the drivers of racism. Religion, race, ethnicity and gender overlap and determine intersectional forms of discrimination that are taken into account while studying Islamophobia.

Discourses on (im)migration thus intersect some narratives of Muslim hatred and often shape the overall scenario in which they develop, and this happens through time. The diachronic perspective adopted in describing the formation of anti-Muslim hatred in the country reports permitted the highlighting of this connection. In the Belgian context for example, policies on integration of migrants constitute the background of the development of some specific narratives of hatred addressing Muslims. Moreover, this perspective led to demonstrate that in most cases narratives are anchored in the past and very recent events only contribute to reshaping them through stressing some arguments or adding new ones, or to strengthening them in terms of harshness and concrete impact. The Gulf War, the debates over some controversial issues (the Salman Rushdie affair or the Danish cartoons to cite some), the rise of the Islamic State, terrorist attacks, the refugees crisis, are considered here as performative tropes that trigger specific but not totally new actions toward Muslim populations. The worldwide diffusion of these tropes through massive media coverage creates a globalized discourse on Islam and Muslims which is relocated and discursively re-contextualized in each state. To give an example of this process, we can mention that in the Czech Republic, the media coverage of the New Year's Eve sexual assaults that occurred in Cologne in 2015 played a crucial role in nourishing and spreading the local narrative of hatred describing Muslims as sexual predators. In fact, open group raping was falsely described by some press as a specific and common Muslim tradition.

Moreover, the connections often made between some of these tropes serve to reinforce narratives of hatred by letting them be effective in different semantic and pragmatic areas and to reach a wider public. Combining for example the issue of a supposed (organized) invasion of Muslims associated to massive refugees flows – a discursive formation on the “Islamisation” of immigration emerges here – with that of the security threat that Muslims would constitute inferred from terrorist attacks, leads to shape narratives of hatred which function within the domains of immigration and of domestic defence politics and policies, and which are intercepted by actors dealing with both, as they merge “anti-refugee sentiment,

⁸ The acknowledgement of Islamophobia as sociological phenomenon can occur without – and more often before – requiring a precise definition of what Islamophobia is in conceptual terms and thus also triggering an epistemic question (we refer in particular to the English context).

⁹ In Belgium the debate on the use of Islamophobia over other expressions to describe Muslim hatred is spread both at the political, scholarly and civil society levels, leading to different positionings of the actors involved with regard to this notion.

¹⁰ This data may be partially available but only in recent times. In Germany, for example the first national report focusing exclusively on Islamophobia was published only in 2016. Besides this, this legal context still entailed – as it happens in other contexts, such as Portugal among others – the inexistence of official “reliable and nationwide data on Islamophobic incidents” (Younes 2016, p.182).

Islamophobia and patriotic nationalism” (Younes 2016: 183)¹¹. Only rarely some of these tropes seem to trigger narratives which did not exist before. This is probably the case for Greece, where 2015 is marked as a crucial turning point, since the discourses on the refugee crisis coupled with those on the threat of IS functioned as potent ideological accelerators of narratives of Islamophobia that started developing. However, such process also included the capitalization of historical discourses and fears through connecting the refugee crisis with the policy – an expansionist undeclared war against Greece – of the historical foe, Turkey. Equally, in Hungary Islamophobia generated together with the discourses around the migration crisis and within the political context of the populist illiberal regime that built the “migration-Islam-terrorism” nexus out of Islam as former “non-issue”. Also in the Czech Republic, the spread of specific tropes (discourses on fundamentalism and terrorist attacks in this case) triggered a new visibility of Islam in the country. In fact, in the first decade after the fall of communism, Islam did not play any important role in public discourse (Čermáková, Janků, Linhartová, 2016).

4. Narratives

Based on different methodologies, as noted above, the country reports pointed out, for each state, the ten most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred and proposed a qualitative ranking in terms of relevance and impact. Before attempting a more quantitative comparison of this set of discourses with the aim of producing a structured list, it is worth analysing in qualitative terms some convergences that emerge among them as recurrent and inclusive discursive formations. The theoretical landscape where they develop – informed by certain pieces of literature and by media and political products and statements from a variety of actors – is that of a sometimes latent, some other times overt and in any case still present form of Orientalism. In continuity with the theorization by Said (1978), Orientalism appears in contemporary times as a discursive process of othering that targets Muslims and Islam in migration contexts as incorporating the ultimate cultural difference that would not fit ethnocentric and evolutionist views of culture, and would not follow the route to civilizational progress traced by Europe. Various mechanisms of essentialization, not only subtracting Islam from the Eurocentric path but also withdrawing from it the very same issue of temporality – Islam has and will never undergo changes –, are aimed first at racializing and then criminalizing Muslims. A demonised oriental/Muslim “other” is now understood as it was previously the normal(ised) oriental/Muslim “other”. The discourses spread about Muslims’ alleged “partial identity” (in Greece for example), or regarding their supposed aggressive and sexually exploitative character (in Hungary, among others), or about decisive threat to Western state values, norms and security¹², aim to perpetuate the exclusion and to denounce the impossible incorporation of Muslims in the local society and they have the consequence of entitling them with an always incomplete social citizenship. Reports also show how these mechanisms of essentialization shape through discourses whose declared intention is, paradoxically, to denounce islamophobia. In the United Kingdom, the renowned Runnymede Trust report, that at first glance seems to have functioned all around Europe as a crucial turning point in the process of recognition of Islamophobia as specific – and worth dealing with – form of racism¹³, indeed contributed to reinforcing obstructing tropes, such as the overused distinction between Islamophobia and legitimate criticism of Islam. Besides this, the report implicitly recognizes the racialization of Muslims, and while focusing on the idea of Muslims as political subjects¹⁴, it overlooks both the history and impact – on the formulation of what anti-Muslim hostility or

¹¹ In the United Kingdom these narratives played a crucial role in the EU referendum and impacted on its results.

¹² Most of the very same narratives of hatred that are listed in the country reports and below can be considered as forms of Muslims’ essentialization.

¹³ The report responded to a required act of naming in relation to the problem of Islamophobia (Vakil, 2009). In France, for example, Tariq Ramadan (1998) followed by the mainstream media, reintroduced the term on the basis of the findings of this report.

¹⁴ Indeed, this is not coupled with the recognition of Muslims’ agency. As Sayyid puts it, Islamophobia needs to be understood as an undermining of both the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future and the ability to articulate themselves as Muslims / citizens and as Muslim citizens (Sayyid, 2014).

prejudice looked and felt like – of long running cultural tropes, colonial praxis and post-colonial domestic contingencies of the British state (in particular) with regard to racialised social relations.

The inclusive discursive formations emerging in this theoretical scenario include, first of all, the conception – conceptualization and argumentation through concrete facts – of the *question musulmane* (Fadil, 2016; Norton, 2013; Haijaj and Mohammed, 2013; Fernando, 2014), the Muslim question, or of Muslims as problems for Western societies. This conception, coupled with processes of culturalization and stereotyping resulting from the Orientalist landscape described above, functions as a starting point from which specific narratives shape and deploy. In spite of the relatively recent appearance of this discursive formation in these semantic terms, already in the past it is manifested in embryonic – but equally persuasive – forms. For example, the German empire developed a Middle-Eastern policy, an *Islampolitik*, after the Berlin's national Colonial Congresses of 1905 and 1910, where Islam and the danger it represented to the colonies was heavily discussed (Habermas 2012, p.125). This example shows how the conception of the *question musulmane* determined the settlement of specific institutional bodies – or of specific tasks within institutional bodies – aimed at dealing with this alleged problem and the shapes that it is blamed to have progressively taken. Particularly in contemporary times, specific anti-terrorism and anti-radicalization policies¹⁵ and contemporary racialized policies in more general terms are among these controlling tools and they also respond to a parallel narrative describing Muslims and Islam as security threat (see later). These policies are coupled both with new practices – such as, to cite two examples from the Czech report, the unprecedented introduction of metal detectors to screen foreign tourists that visit Prague castle each day or the constitutional amendment that enable Czechs to acquire and possess a gun for security purposes – and with already known actions of surveillance and control such as ethnic and religious profiling targeting Muslims (as the French “stop-and-search practices”¹⁶).

Another common issue related to some of the identified narratives is that of morality, that can be elaborated in at least two ways. On the one hand, morality is directly mobilized to highlight the incompatibility of Muslims and Islam with European norms and values established during Enlightenment and considered as universally shared across time in Western socio-cultural settings, thus denying the very same humanity of Muslims with regard to these criteria. This moral incompatibility is described not only on the basis of an assumed general cultural diversity or of the attribution of flagrant and generalized violent acts, but also through making specific accusations¹⁷. For example, a moral decline or failure is described with regard to gender-based violence described as being spread in French suburbs, or to both male and female perverse sexuality, a narrative inferred in the United Kingdom from single-sex schooling or gender segregation experiences. To give another example, Muslim asylum seekers are blamed – this is common discourse through several countries – for hiding the real (economic) reasons of their displacement and for undertaking illegal routes to reach Europe¹⁸. In Hungary, Muslim migrants are blamed for not fighting ISIS and then described as morally problematic. On the other hand, the notion of “moral panic” (Fadil et al., 2014) can be applied to the analysis of the discourses diffused through different means in order to point out their effect in the mainstream society on legitimating the

¹⁵ Among several examples mentioned in the country reports, we can recall the 2015 Counterterrorism and Security Act and the 2006 Channel program (part of the PREVENT action) in the United Kingdom, and also the Belgian 2004 Plan-R.

¹⁶ See Défenseur des droits, 2017 for details.

¹⁷ In the Czech Republic, reproving Muslims for behaviours judged as fanatic, impulsive and not respectful (to women in particular) are not associated, as it may happen elsewhere, to moral neglect. In fact, paradoxically, other local discourses spread a representation of Muslims as being less selfish and less immoral than non-Muslims. The supposed instinctive nature of Muslims is then seen both as dangerous and fascinating with regard to the overcivilized Western culture.

¹⁸ This discourse is highlighted in the Greek report but it is also quite common in other countries, even if the reference to the assigned religion of refugees may not be overt.

description of Muslims and Islam as a threat to fear as well as – as a consequence – of the urgent need of various forms of intervention.

Discourses on Muslims and Islam as being a threat – and the concrete reiteration of the role of the state and its organs as bearers of people’s sovereignty exerted through governmental and biopolitical techniques of power¹⁹ – build upon a variety of arguments that the country reports exemplify. Muslims and Islam are represented as a threat to the religious identity of a nation (Christianity for Greece and Hungary²⁰ in particular) whose role becomes then to protect such identity against adverse effects or significant changes that would concern it. Often legitimated by nationalistic ideologies, this role can indeed cover broader geographical areas – and semantic fields – when the nation concerned occupies a geo-political space that makes it function as responsible for dealing with the moral identity and the very same culture – intended as homogeneous and unanimously adopted throughout the whole territory – of a more extended region. The position of the concerned state in relation to the European core – inside, outside or at the margins of continental Europe – can determine the development of narratives on Islam and Muslims which are in line with specific roles attributed to the state to preserve such core. The case of Greece is exemplary in which two parallel discursive processes are shaped through, respectively, conservative narratives and liberal narratives. The former are grounded both on the anti-Turkish historical legacy and the opposition to European supposed multiculturalism that would foster the “invasion of Muslims”, and they trigger the adoption of an anti-Islamic version of nationalism. The latter place strong emphasis on the European dimension of the perceived threat of Islam and they depict Greece as the bastion of Christian Europe and as an integral part of the European whole whose cultural entity originating in the legacy of the Enlightenment and human rights must be protected. Similarly, Hungarian national identity builds upon the state’s and its people’s claim to be “bulwarks of Christianity” (Brubaker, 2017: 19) in charge of protecting Christian Europe – and its civilization – against the invasion of Muslims. Within other discourses, such moral identity to be secured can also be boasted as secular but, paradoxically, equally described as threatened by Muslims and Islam. The debate on secular national identity is particularly intense in France and it also triggers – among other issues and as in other countries, such as Belgium and the United Kingdom – a stigmatization of the veil and consequent narratives on the need to reorient the femininity of Muslim women toward secularized habits. Besides this, the alleged threat to democracy is discursively constructed through describing how Muslim people would be responsible for attacking its founding principles – through strategies of “entryism”²¹, i.e. through their participation in civic life – or for being subjects whose ways of existing within democratic contexts would entail its failure. In the United Kingdom (as well as in the Czech Republic) this discourse is articulated through the representation of Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism and as symbols of the failure of such social praxis²². The sovereignty of the state takes here the form of a moral engagement in assuring the threatened – at different levels – security of its people and it determines the establishment of a set of actions to address the described dangers. To reinforce the concreteness and the effectiveness of these positions, some discursive tools are mobilized, such as the description of imminent apocalyptic scenarios, as it happens in Germany with the discourses about the rise of Muslim population linked to influx of refugees in the country. Statistical alarmism on the supposed exponential and unrestrainable increase of Muslims in Europe (or in specific countries and cities, as for Brussels, where such alarmism is constructed upon the analysis of demographic trends) nourishes the depiction

¹⁹ This analysis emerges particularly in the Belgian and German report.

²⁰ It is worth noting that in Hungary, where Islamophobia appeared together with some recent tropes, as we will better illustrate later, the Hungarian Muslim community is not seen as a threat as it is dissociated from current flows of supposedly dangerous newcomers.

²¹ This trope has recently developed in the United Kingdom to describe Muslims’ alleged means to inveigle themselves into institutions and positions of power with the aim of threatening democracy “from inside”.

²² Using the idea that these practices have somehow favored Muslims, the roll-back from the idea of multiculturalism has a twofold effect; on the one hand it marks out Muslims as receiving undeserved privileges from the state and on the other hand it removes the responsibility of the state for dealing with issues like racism, since Muslims would be undeserving of integration into the cultural fabric of the nation.

of these scenarios. As well as various elaborations of a conspiracy theory of the Islamization of the West do²³, fostering the need to Europeanise – or secularize – Islam as a form of “necessary and desirable” assimilation (Asad, 2003). The political – and social – pressures constitute a way to socially engineer the acceptance of a depoliticized and secular Islam amongst Muslims in several of the considered states²⁴.

5. Conclusion: categorical list

Interlocking with the inclusive discursive formations described above, specific narratives of Muslim hatred are accounted for by each state report²⁵. These narratives are informed by and inform different practices of islamophobia, some of which appear as more overt and visible, while some others act silently but equally strongly. Their impact has been described mainly at the political and media levels, because the focus of the analysis within the framework of this project is discourse, attested as particularly significant within these two domains. However, these narratives also strongly affect everyday life of Muslims in the considered states, and this has been shown through some concrete examples, ranging from proven accounts of discrimination in the work domain, within the schooling system and in the housing market (leading to progressive ghettoization and alleged auto-segregation in the three domains), to repeated attacks to mosques, micro aggressions, insults, threats, acts of intimidation and direct verbal or physical violence in public space, targeting Muslim women in particular.

The comparison between the eight lists of the most relevant narratives of Muslim hatred identified in each considered state and ranked in qualitative terms by estimating and considering their relative strength, recurrence and impact, has been methodologically organized as follows. First, each narrative has been attributed a score on the basis of its position in the list. Then, through cross-checking the eight lists, narratives based on the same contents have been brought together permitting to define for each theme (that we may call “umbrella narrative”²⁶) an overall score. We will see that some narratives which were separated in country reports can here participate of one thematic narrative. On the basis of this counting, the considered umbrella narratives have been ordered in descending rank and presented in the table below.

²³ Particularly violent are the discourses spread by the PEGIDA movement both in Germany and in Belgium.

²⁴ This process is clearly highlighted as occurring in Belgium and in the United Kingdom.

²⁵ Interestingly, the Czech Republic report distinguishes between Islamophobic and Muslimophobic narratives, highlighting the different object of discriminating discourse. This distinction will not be adopted in this comparative analysis.

²⁶ As a consequence, we mean for “umbrella narrative” a theme that is covered by examples coming from at least two countries. Thus, single-country based narratives, even if they are relatively highly ranked in the country in question, cannot shape an “umbrella narrative” alone and are then excluded from the global ranking. This means that some narratives mentioned in the country reports do not emerge here.

Relative ranking	Umbrella narrative	Countries narratives
1	Threat to security ²⁷	Radicalization of Muslims (BE) Muslims as problems: anti-radicalization and anti-terrorism policies (BE) Muslims use public funding to promote Islamic fundamentalism (PT) Muslims will provide the manpower for and organize terrorist attacks in Greece (GR) Muslims and extremism (UK) Muslims as a security threat (UK) Muslims as terrorists (CR) Muslims and terrorism (HU) Muslims as a security threat (FR) Link between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism (FR) Muslims as terrorist sympathizers (FR) Muslim suburban youths resorting to radical forms of Islamism or to violence (FR) Islamic terrorism (DE)
2	Unassimilable ²⁸	Non-integrated character or unwilling to integrate (DE) Muslims are unassimilable [ASSIMILATION] (PT) Muslims will severe, as an unassimilable community, the social and cultural cohesion in Greece (GR) Muslims will severe, as an unassimilable community, the social and cultural cohesion of Europe (GR)

²⁷ We include in this umbrella narrative different discourses and practices that associate Muslims and Islam to the tropes of fundamentalism, radicalisation and terrorism.

²⁸ The non-integrability umbrella narrative is linked with the trope of the incomplete citizenship that follows at point 9 in which it presupposes that Muslims in Europe are in any case outsiders of the national context where they live – independently from individuals’ legal status and history. Starting from this consideration, the discourses here presented depict Muslims and Islam as not being possible objects of inclusion in the local society.

		<p>Disloyalty and the Threat to Internal Democracy (UK)</p> <p>Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism (UK)</p> <p>Failed multiculturalism narrative (CR)</p> <p>Muslims unwilling or unable to integrate into French society (FR)</p> <p>Muslim suburban youths as social and economic outcasts (FR)</p>
3	Demographic threat and proselytization ²⁹	<p>Invasion of Muslims and Islamisation of the country (DE)</p> <p>Brussels is turning into a Muslim city (BE)</p> <p>Islam is a proselyte religion, which aims to ‘invade our territory’ and take over ‘our way of life’ (PT)</p> <p>Muslims serve as the blind instruments of Turkish expansionist views on Greece by settling on the Aegean Islands (GR)</p> <p>Muslims will deliberately try to de-Christianize Greece and turn it into an Islamic country (GR)</p> <p>Immigration and the demographic threat (UK)</p> <p>The narrative of organized invasion (CR)</p> <p>Conspiracy theory: Migration leading to Islamization of Europe (HU)</p> <p>Migration leading to Islamization of Europe (HU)</p>
4	Theocracy ³⁰	<p>Islamic parallel societies (DE)</p> <p>Islam does not rely on democracy and the rule of law, but on the rule of God and is prone to autocracy (PT)</p> <p>Muslims incompatibility rests on the rejection of the secular state (GR)</p> <p>Islamic practices need to be secularized to be accepted in Western societies (BE)</p>

²⁹ This umbrella narrative refers to the analysed discourses that are aimed at denouncing the alleged increase of the number of Muslim individuals in European countries as well as the supposed consequent spread of Islamic religion at the expense of the state different moral identity.

³⁰ The discourses gathered around this theme stress the supposed prevalence of the exclusive reference to religious norms and values made by Muslims when dealing with societal matters.

		<p>Veiling is incompatible with Western values and local rules (BE)</p> <p>Muslim in need of integration (assimilation) (UK)</p> <p>The anachronistic religion narrative (CR)</p> <p>Religious symbols as an underhanded attempt on secularism (FR)</p>
5	Threat to identity ³¹	<p>Islam threatens local traditions (BE)</p> <p>Muslim presence will inevitably (and not as a part of a pre-constructed plan) lead to the loss or corruption of Greek national identity (GR)</p> <p>Muslims serve as the instruments of leftist attacks to Greek cultural and national foundations (GR)</p> <p>Islamisation as destruction of our culture (HU)</p> <p>Islam is a threat to our European Christian civilization (HU)</p> <p>Islam is a threat to our national and Christian identity (HU)</p> <p>Islam as a threat to French national identity (FR)</p>
6	Gender inequality ³²	<p>Gender inequality in Muslim communities (DE)</p> <p>Islamic religion legitimates extreme forms of women oppression (BE)</p> <p>Islam and Muslims are sexist in larger amounts than what one can see in the West (PT)</p> <p>Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman (UK)</p> <p>Muslims as segregationists (UK)</p> <p>The women oppression narrative (CR)</p> <p>Deviant sexuality (DE)</p> <p>The sexual predators narrative (CR)</p>

³¹ As the examples – and the above analysis – show, this threat and its object are shaped differently depending on the context where they are conceptualized.

³² This umbrella narrative includes more generally those discourses aimed at essentializing and demonizing gender differences as well as the characteristics attributed to Muslim women and men.

		Women as oppressed victims (FR)
7	Ontological diversity ³³	<p>Ontological distinct from non-Muslim nationals / population (DE)</p> <p>Islam does not allow freedom of speech (PT)</p> <p>Islam does not allow modern science with it, as Western civilization does (hence, Muslims are not led by rational decision-making) (PT)</p> <p>Muslims will help diffuse a culture of disrespect towards human rights (GR)</p> <p>Islam as a counter to ‘Britishness’ / ‘Fundamental British Values’ (UK)</p> <p>Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to ‘human’ norms (UK)</p> <p>The barbarian narrative (Muslims as a natural hazard, as parasites) (CR)</p> <p>Muslims as Gypsies (CR)</p> <p>Islam is an alien religion, culture for Hungarians (HU)</p>
8	Innate violence ³⁴	<p>Innate sense of violence (DE)</p> <p>Islam advocates violence, Muslims are prone to violence (PT)</p> <p>Islam as an expansive violent religion (CR)</p>
9	Incomplete citizenship ³⁵	<p>Mosques do not have their place in the local context (BE)</p> <p>Muslims should not come to and become visible in Hungary (HU)</p> <p>Muslims illegitimate and not fully French (FR)</p> <p>Islamic belonging is a prior identity marker (BE)</p>

³³ Various narratives represent Muslims and Islam as essentially and irremediably different – most in terms of values, norms and racial characterizations – from local non-Muslim population and the associated moral landscape.

³⁴ This would concern both Muslims individuals and Islamic religion on the basis of historical and recent events mobilized to nourish this narrative.

³⁵ As recalled for the unassimilable umbrella narrative, this means that Muslims are often not entailed with full citizenship rights in European countries and their demands to counter this incomplete status are thus treated as religiously based illegitimate claims that would put at risk – instead of falling within – the majority’s social rules.

10	Homophobia ³⁶	Muslim homophobia (DE) Islam is bigotry and thus intolerant towards homosexuals (PT)
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³⁶ This narrative mainly includes discourses about Muslims stating that they would not accept the social recognition of other forms of sexual relationships than heterosexual ones.

The application of a quantitative methodology to compare qualitative data, in spite of the bias that it could be object of, makes sense in which it is accompanied by and contextualised in a broader discursive background and interpretative framework that we have illustrated in this report. This approach is indeed useful to identify a clear set of prevailing hatred messages to be addressed by counter-narratives aimed at questioning and combatting them. The table showed this set by presenting the first ten umbrella narratives gathered throughout the reports and the forms in which they are shaped in the different countries considered. The lists of narratives as they were reported in the countries papers have been included as Appendix in order to make it possible to compare the actual ranking (of narratives and themes) with the original contextual ranking of each narrative. An explanation of the criteria adopted to determine the country ranking follows each list. This analytical exercise lets us put into perspective the obtained results, without mistrusting their usefulness, as argued above, for the following steps of this project.

6. Appendix

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Belgium

1. Islamic practices need to be secularized to be accepted in Western societies
2. Veiling is incompatible with Western values and local rules
3. Islamic belonging (claimed or assigned) is a prior identity marker
4. Islam threatens Belgian traditions
5. Brussels is turning into a Muslim city
6. A process of radicalization of Muslims is underway in Belgium
7. Islam is (and Muslims are) a problem for Western societies
8. Islam is easy object of derision
9. Islamic religion legitimates extreme forms of women oppression
10. Mosques do not have their place in the local context

These narratives have been first organized in three main overlapping domains: the politics domain, the mass-media domain and the everyday life domain. Going beyond this repartition, an assessment of their relative strength has been attempted without neglecting to account for the difficulties of this task. In fact, these narratives inform the different forms – at times overlapping – of Islamophobia that shape as discourses, acts or policies. Moreover, they have not been collected and investigated through quantitative sampling, so to make it difficult to rank them in order of dominance. Nevertheless, a qualitative evaluation of their relative impact has been produced in terms of the significance and estimated coverage in contemporary times of the Islamophobic acts that they are related to. In fact, the social pressure exerted on Muslims to eventually (re)orient their practice of their faith has significant impact in de-legitimizing the role of Islam in Belgian society. The issue of veiling is one among the most addressed practices in this process. The use of a univocal reading lens to position Muslim representatives in the intellectual and political local sphere as mere bearer of religious interests is an equally strong instrument of discrimination and, moreover, it puts constraints to eventual changes. The narrative stating that “Islam threatens Belgian traditions” has been classified as highly significant since it is often the starting point – or the implicit message – on which further narratives rely on. This narrative goes together with denouncing the demographic increase of Muslims in Belgium. The narratives concerning recent violent facts associated to Islam, while being equally significant and partly rooted in past processes, come later because of their strong link to temporality, which may let us foresee possible changes. The last three narratives, despite their potential and effective violence, are listed below because of the estimated low quantitative incidence of the islamophobic acts that they concern.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in the Czech Republic

1. The narrative of radicalization (Muslims as terrorists)
2. The failed multiculturalism narrative (Islam as an antidemocratic threat)
3. The slippery-slope narrative (Islam demands more and more, we need to stop their demands now)
4. The anachronistic religion narrative
5. The violent religion narrative (Islam as an expansive violent religion)
6. The Women oppression narrative

7. The Muslims as Gypsies narrative
8. The barbarian narrative (Muslims as a natural hazard, Muslims as parasites)
9. The sexual predators narrative
10. The narrative of organized invasion

The narratives were ordered on the basis of a discourse analysis of TV debates (broadcast both on public and private TV channels), nationwide newspapers and internet, blogs and Facebook pages of Islamophobic initiatives. The ranking methods combined three dimensions: (1) frequency of narratives, (2) diversity of channels through which narrative were spread (mainstream media, social media, personal web pages, Facebook discussions), (3) diversity of proponents of narratives (politicians, public intellectuals, so-called experts, policy makers, anti-Islam activists, general public voices). Narratives with a high ranking scored high in all dimensions, on the other hand, narratives with a low ranking were less frequent and were associated with a narrow spectrum of channels and proponents (mainly disseminated by anti-Islam activists through social media).

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in France

1. Muslims as a security threat
2. Link between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism
3. Muslims as terrorist sympathisers
4. Muslims unwilling or unable to integrate into French society
5. A threat to French national identity
6. Muslims illegitimate and not fully French
7. Religious symbols as an underhanded attempt on secularism
8. Women as oppressed victims
9. Muslim suburban youths were from then on framed as social and economic outcasts
10. Muslim suburban youths resorting to radical forms of Islamism or to violence

This report attempts not only to identify the prevailing narratives of Muslim hatred within the French context but also to rank those narratives according to their intensity, frequency and impact they may have on the Muslim population. The narratives themselves were first divided into two areas according to the discursive environments in which they occur: media and political discourse – they were merged since most political narratives find resonance in the media representation of Muslims – and everyday life. In the course of our investigation, however, we faced a number of methodological challenges as to the classification of the narratives. Firstly, though analysing quantitative data sets (e.g. frequency of occurrence of anti-Muslim narratives in a particular environment, measurement of impact based on Islamophobic acts and so on) might have given the ranking a statistical validity, given limited time and resources we opted for a qualitative evaluation of their importance rather than for a quantitative research method. Secondly, there is an evident overlap between the before-mentioned areas and the categories of narratives – moreover, most anti-Muslim media and political discourses shape attitudes towards Muslims and feed into discrimination thereof in everyday life situations – which made their ranking in order of importance a complicated task. Thirdly, we decided to choose media coverage of different incidents and events as an indicator of intensity and impact of the narratives on the Muslim populations. Other indicators, such as interdependence between narratives and acts of Islamophobia reported by the civil

society and practitioners, were considered for the area of everyday life discrimination. We are therefore aware that the ranking presented in this report may be considered impressionistic, relative and time-bound.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Germany

1. Non-integrated character or unwilling to integrate
2. Gender inequality in Muslim communities
3. “Islamic terrorism”
4. Distinction between German and Muslims in terms of values, norms and racial characterizations
5. Innate sense of violence
6. Muslim anti-Semitism
7. Islamic parallel societies
8. Muslim homophobia
9. The Islamization of Germany
10. Deviant or abnormal Muslim sexuality

The prevalence and dominance of the narratives listed above have fluctuated in accordance to manifold factors, including how public policy and institutions, media representations, and organizations of the civil society have framed and reacted to alleged problems caused by Muslims and Islam in Germany. This constant fluctuation poses a challenge to the assessment of the strength and dissemination of these narratives in a diachronic and synchronic analysis. Thus, a synchronic take on the unfolding of the narratives would outline particular moments when a narrative dominated the discursive field (e.g. the aftermath of 9/11 the focus on terrorism, or 2005 marked by the preeminence of discussions around gender inequality in particular “honor killing”), while a diachronic analysis would center on how some narratives have remained and organized the deployments of Islamophobia in the arenas of politics, the media, and everyday life for a longer period of time, for instance, the extend to which the narrative of integration has remained constant and unchallenged, at least, for the last two decades. The present report has tried to combine these two frames on analysis based on academic literature about the topic, and a brief survey in media outlets with national distribution.

The capacity of a narrative to organize, interlock, embrace and sustain other narratives was another principle used in this report to rank the strength of the narratives; for instance, the allegation of gender inequality more often than not has been paired with the supposed intolerance of Muslim communities towards sexual diversity. Both narratives threaded with the distinction between German and Muslims in terms of values, norms and racial characterizations. In this sense, the dominance of one narrative over others from a diachronic point of view also relates to its entanglement the function this interlocking serves to sustain the problematization of Muslims and Islam.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Greece

1. They will provide the manpower for and organize terrorist attacks in Greece (Extreme Right, Conservative Right, Liberals)
2. They serve as the blind instruments of Turkish expansionist views on Greece by settling on the Aegean Islands (Extreme Right and Conservative Right)

3. They are used by EU bureaucrats and/or other 'globalists' to dismantle the European nation state (Extreme Right)
4. They will deliberately try to de-Christianize Greece and turn it into an Islamic country (mostly Conservative Right and, secondarily, Extreme Right)
5. Their presence will inevitably (and not as a part of a pre-constructed plan) lead to the loss or corruption of Greek national identity (Conservative Right)
6. They serve as the instruments of leftist attacks to Greek cultural and national foundations (Extreme Right and Conservative Right)
7. They will sever, as an unassimilable community, the social and cultural cohesion in Greece (Conservative Right and Liberals)
8. They will sever, as an unassimilable community, the social and cultural cohesion of Europe (mostly Liberals and, to a lesser extent, Conservatives)
9. They will help diffuse a culture of disrespect towards human rights (mostly Liberals and to a lesser extent, Conservatives)
10. Their incompatibility rests on the rejection of the secular state (Liberals)

The different intellectual premises of each narrative make their comparison in terms of popularity difficult since it is clear that they appeal to different audiences. Beyond doubt, the narrative that ties Muslim presence to terrorism is by far the most prevalent across ideological orientations. The very fact of its adoption by all ideological families is a safe criterion for the classification of terrorism as the most popular Islamophobic narrative.

Both quantitative public opinion surveys and the discursive material discussed demonstrate Islamophobia's nationalist, right-wing foundations. This safely leads us to the conclusion that narratives stressing the national danger or danger to the Christian religion posed by the presence of Muslim immigrants or refugees in the country are the most popular after the dominant narrative of terrorist attacks. The Islamization and de-Christianization of Greece are points of convergence of Conservative and Extreme Right narratives; this needs to be taken into account. Conspiracy theories pertaining to globalization and narratives that aim at the Right's leftist rivals remain marginal in terms of the frequency of their appearance in the discourse, yet in qualitative terms, are clearly Islamophobic in nature.

Liberal narratives of Islamophobia remain, mostly, peripheral, in terms of the frequency of their appearance, not only as Liberal voices, but even more due to the emphasis placed on European identity, the secular state and its cultural legacy. With nationalism dominating narratives of Islamophobia, the Liberal narratives are the least popular. The very existence, however, of coherent Liberal narratives in anti-Muslim discourse is an alarming development with the narrative associating violation of human rights with Islam being the most prominent.

The criterion of ranking is dual. On the one hand, we took into account each narrative's appeal across ideological families and, on the other, each ideological family's proclivity to Islamophobia. This is the reason why liberal narratives were not accorded dominant status since liberal Islamophobia is underdeveloped and denounced by the majority of liberals. What is more, Islamophobia, as expressed in those narratives, is not infused with hatred, which is why they are ranked lower than Extreme Right and Conservative narratives.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Hungary

1. Conspiracy theory: Migration leading to Islamization of Europe generated by Europe/EU/liberals/the left + some capitalist figures
2. Migration leading to Islamization of Europe generated by Europe/EU/liberals/the left
3. Islamisation: migration=occupation of Europe, destruction of our culture
4. Islam is a threat to our European Christian civilization
5. Islam is a threat to our national and Christian identity
6. Muslims should not come to and become visible in Hungary
7. Islam is an alien religion, culture for Hungarians
8. Failure of democratization of Muslim countries (led to migration from these countries)
9. Muslim terrorists/terrorism: arriving with migration flow; coming from aggressive culture; migration is generated by ISIS; home born Muslim terrorists in Western countries
10. Muslim migrants blamed for not fighting ISIS (Muslims morally problematic)

Our analysis was a qualitative one, therefore, it was not possible to make a quantified ranking of the narratives as to their dominance and significance. Therefore, we created a qualitative ranking scheme³⁷ that attempts to address the issue of how dominant or significant different narratives are.

In the refugee crisis narratives within the two frames, we found narratives with and without reference to Islam/Muslims. Those without reference are ranked as less significant than those with reference. Political narratives, as we have seen from the qualitative analysis, are less directly linked to providing Islamophobic framework for the refugee crisis. While the media, using the same narratives, amplify and make it overt what the political narratives only imply, therefore, we considered political narratives as less significant than media narratives, and political and media narratives together (narratives appearing in both) as the most significant.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Portugal

1. Islam advocates violence, Muslims are prone to violence [VIOLENCE]
2. Islam and Muslims are sexist in larger amounts than what one can see in the West [SEXISM]
3. Islam does not rely on democracy and the rule of law, but on the rule of God and is prone to autocracy [THEOCRATIC]
4. Muslims are intolerant (INTOLERANCE)
5. Muslims as unassimilable [ASSIMILATION]
6. Islam is a proselyte religion, which aims to 'invade our territory' and take over 'our way of life' [PROSELYTISM]
7. Islam does not allow freedom of speech [NO FREEDOM OF SPEECH]
8. Islam is bigotry and thus intolerant towards homosexuals [HOMOPHOBIC]
9. Muslims use public funding to promote Islamic fundamentalism [FUNDAMENTALISM]

³⁷ See the country report for details.

10. Islam does not allow modern science within it, as Western civilization does (hence, Muslims are not led by rational decision-making) [IRRATIONAL]

Given the practical absence of work on Islamophobia in Portugal – particularly policy analyses and empirical studies –, and attempting to grasp common narratives that may be considered as Islamophobic following Sayyid's typologies, the report draws mainly on research on online discourse on Islam and Muslims. A search in Google for the term 'Islamophobia' and 'Muslims' within the domain '.pt' helped narrow down the results: the entries considered involved not only talk about Muslims (which produced too many results for a feasible analysis), but some sort of categorisation of such talk as Islamophobic (thus accounting for hate speech, its critique, and the accommodation of the critique). It also enabled to map the emergence of the concept in public discourse in Portugal. The initial online search was carried out in February 2017 and updated later on, in early April. It covered 5 year intervals, in the periods: 1990-1994; 1995-1999 (both with no entries that were actually published on those dates); 2000-2004; 2005-2009; 2010-2017 (as of 31 March). The first three or four Google pages with results were screened for relevance. Over 100 entries were analysed, and consisted mainly of news outlets online, social commentary and personal blogs.

Although Google search mechanisms vary from context to context, and results depend on the profile of the user, it is clear that the web entries found were all very popular in the Portuguese context. The data collected does not make it possible to indisputably place the ten narratives in a quantitative ranking – this is also due to categories overlapping, and whether they are constructed separately or jointly may depend more on the category coding of the researcher or the specificities of the political context analysed than on their intrinsic qualities. Despite such limitation, these ten narratives are very common and may be found in a variety of spheres, such as in politics, mass-media and everyday life.

Some of these narratives are often deployed together (e.g. portraying Islam as anti-liberal and hence, against freedom of speech, gender and sexual equality), but the articulation of categories may vary depending on the issue at stake (e.g. violence and gender: Muslims are prone to violence and this can supposedly be seen in domestic violence against women). What seems to be common, particularly in online commentary, is that these narratives and repertoires seem to be already there, ready-made, at the disposal of whatever issue may 'justify' evoking them. Although not considered *correct* – by state and institutional representatives – they have been consensualised as legitimate concerns ('Is Islam violent'? How do Muslim women live?') – and the media has played a large role in this.

Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in the United Kingdom

1. Disloyalty and the Threat to Internal Democracy
2. Islam as a counter to 'Britishness' / 'Fundamental British Values'
3. Muslims and 'extremism'
4. Muslims as a security threat (and therefore in need of regulation by way of exceptional law, policy and social praxis)
5. Muslim misogyny and perversion and the oppressed Muslim woman
6. Muslims as subhuman and unable to socialize to 'human' norms
7. Muslims as segregationists
8. Muslims in need of integration (assimilation)
9. Muslims as the vanguards of multiculturalism

10. Immigration and the demographic threat

The ranking of Islamophobic Narratives in the UK was based on an analysis of the preponderance of particular narratives across a three to five-year period prior to the writing of report, and their perceived impact in policy terms.

A statistical analysis of the prevalence of identified tropes in media and political discourse, could have provided an alternative mode of ranking, however it was felt that this did not capture how such narratives impact social and political life. Pre-existing analysis that used quantitative methods of assessing frequency of certain tropes formed part of the background to this analysis. Thus a qualitative approach that analysed how such narratives not only manifested, but how they fed into other spheres notably between political and media discourse, and became demonstrably impactful through policy decisions that explicitly laid their ideological basis on such narratives. Thus narratives that may have more frequency in the media over the period under review, may not rank as highly as those that appeared within a shorter space of time but resulted in policy and legal outcomes.

Whilst recognising that this (a) has put more emphasis on the importance of the political sphere, (b) raises issues as to measuring impact, it was felt that such an approach was the best policy oriented way to rank the intensity of narratives as an overlap of frequency in media and political discourse and recurrence as part of policy narrative.

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