Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

Dr Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar

Working Paper 2: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Germany

CERS, 2017

This publication has been produced with the financial support of the Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Programme of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Dr Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission.
Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Germany
Dr Luis Manual Hernández Aguilar
CIK: Working Paper 2

About the CIK Project

The Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

©CIK

The CIK consortium holds copyright for the papers published under the auspices of this project. Reproduction in whole or in part of this text is allowed for research and educational purposes with appropriate citation and acknowledgement

Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, 2017.
University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK.
cik@leeds.ac.uk
www.cik.leeds.ac.uk
Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................5
2. A battle of concepts: Islamophobia gaining foot in Germany ..........................................................5
   2.1 Islamfeindlichkeit .......................................................................................................................6
   2.2 Islamophobia ............................................................................................................................7
   2.3 Anti-Muslim Racism ....................................................................................................................9
3. Background: Muslim population in the country ................................................................................10
4. The formation of anti-Muslim hatred: German Orientalism and the forgotten Colonies .............13
   4.1 Hate crimes against Muslim ......................................................................................................14
5. Categorical list of most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred .......................................................19
   5.1 Political discourse/policies .......................................................................................................21
   5.2 Media content .........................................................................................................................25
   5.3 Experiences of discrimination in everyday life .........................................................................26
6. Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................................29
   6.1 Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred .......................................................30
7. References .........................................................................................................................................32
1. Introduction

Based on Ameli & Merali (2015) and Ameli et al. (2012) Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR), this report explores and describes the discursive content and forms that Muslim hatred takes in Germany. The DHMIR was developed as an analytical tool to give account of hate crimes against minority groups and individuals (Ameli & Merali 2015, p.104). The DHMIR underscores the complex context in which hates crimes are perpetrated by elaborating upon the diverse and interlocking discourses, institutions, and practices creating and sustaining an environment of hate (Ameli & Merali 2015, p.104).

Moreover, the report draws on S. Sayyid’s (2014) conceptualization of Islamophobia through its range of deployments, while stressing the historical, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic contexts particular of Germany. The first section of the report maps the existing literature addressing hatred against Muslims. The second presents an overview of the Muslim population in Germany, and a short description of the formation and development of anti-Muslim hatred predating 9/11 and expanding ever since. The final section unravels the main discursive strands shaping Islamophobia/anti-Muslim racism in Germany.

2. A battle of concepts: Islamophobia gaining foot in Germany

In Germany, racism, and islamophobia as a form of racism, has politically and academically remained a highly controversial topic, more often than not treated as a taboo (Terkessidis 2004). While the acknowledgment of anti-Semitism and the guilt surrounding the atrocities perpetrated during the Second World War became prominent topics of national debate and national identity, racism—discursively detached from anti-Semitism—ideologically became a remnant of a distant past, allegedly, isolated in small fringes of society, i.e. neo Nazis groups in East Germany at best or inexistent at worst.

The mythical denazification process started by the allies after Second World War and the re-foundation of Germany through the zero hour (Räthzel 1991; Räthzel 2006) worked as historical dispositifs whereby Germany could (re)imagine itself exempt from the racial anti-Semitic terror of the past. Moreover, the postwar division and existence of two Germanys created historical and political peculiarities for dealing—or not—with racism. This background caused a historical and political void downplaying the German colonial and imperialist past, and minimizing or even ignoring racial violence against Afro-Germans, Roma and Sinti, Muslims, refugees, and migrants, in Germany
“the horror of any form of anti-Semitism can blind people to new and different forms of racism” (Schiffer & Wagner 2011, p.77). Conceptually, the ideological construal about the triumph over of the Nazi era prompted the use of other concepts to describe the reality of the postwar, such as xenophobia (Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Ausländerfeindlichkeit) (for a critique see: Räthzel & Kalpaka 1986), and more recently hostility against Muslims (Muslimfeindlichkeit) and Islam (Islamfeindlichkeit).

Sayyid (2014, p.11) argues that the increasing research on Islamophobia has tended to focus on the arena of media representations and socio-psychological approaches. This situation, to some extent, mirrors the overall research on hatred against Muslims in Germany. However, without diminishing the relevance of these perspectives there is a growing need to understand Islamophobia as a form of racism, its potential links with other forms of discrimination such as anti-Semitism, as well as to examine the role of the state (Sayyid 2014, p.11). This section presents the state of the art concerning hatred against Muslims and Islam. In Germany the concepts hostility against Muslims and Islam have become widely popular among academics and politicians, perhaps, in relation to the stigma surrounding the term racism. Muslimfeindlichkeit, in effect, became the official term to address hatred against Muslims in the German Islam Conference’s protocols (DIK 2011; DIK 2012), since racism was considered an inflammatory concept hurting the sensibilities of those who merely “feel a vague uneasiness about Muslims” (DIK 2011, p.4; for a critique see: Hernández Aguilar 2015, pp.254–260). However, some scholars have also advanced the concept of anti-Muslim racism (Attia 2011; Attia 2009; Attia et al. 2014; Shooman 2011; Shooman 2014; Shooman 2012a; Hernández Aguilar 2015; Hernández Aguilar 2014), while the concept of Islamophobia has begun to be take hold in academic discussions (Cohen & Muhamad-Bradner 2012; Özyürek 2015; Özyürek 2010; Younes 2016). Islamophobia moreover has been recurrently analyzed in comparison to anti-Semitism not without the appearance of heated polemics (Heitmeyer 2011; Benz 2008; Shooman 2015; Schiffer & Wagner 2009; Schiffer & Wagner 2011; Ünal 2016).

2.1 Islamfeindlichkeit

The Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence has been conducting long-term surveys about Group-Focused Enmity, including the examination of anti-Muslim and Islam attitudes (Heitmeyer 2011; Heitmeyer & Imbusch 2005; Heitmeyer & Imbusch 2012; Zick, Hövermann & Krause 2012; Krause & Zick 2013; Zick & Heeren 2012; Zick, Hövermann & Krause 2012; Zick 2012; Bielefeldt
2012; Bielefeldt 2008; Schneiders 2010). Studies departing from this approach favor the concepts Islamfeindlichkeit and Muslimfeindlichkeit, understood as the negative perception and disparagement of Muslims, their culture or religion. Moreover, while maintaining that hostility toward Islam and Muslims tend to be empirically correlated it is argued about the benefits of keeping both dimensions analytically detached and thereby avoid their conflation as the concept of Islamophobia does (Zick 2012, p.35). Conceptually, Islamophobia is restricted to analyze a vague sense of fear of Islam, and the concept does not allow to differentiate between critiques to Islam and Muslims that are hostile and those which are not (Hafez & Schmidt 2015).

A recent research departing from this model found out that 16% of the German population consider Islam as “very threatening” and 35% as “rather threatening” (Hafez & Schmidt 2015), thus more than half of the population has a negative image of Islam (Hafez & Schmidt 2015, p.221). These results are consistent with previous findings where a majority of Germans holds Islam as a religion of intolerance (Zick et al. 2010), and their report also witness the consolidation at a higher level of the threatening perception of Islam in comparison with previous years (Hafez & Schmidt 2015). The poll also surveyed the perception around the question if Islam fits in the Western world, to which 52% of the interviewees responded negatively. These results tally with previous findings surveying this perception (Heitmeyer 2011; Zick et al. 2010). Hafez & Schmidt (2015) conclude that Islam is not perceived as a religion, but as a political ideology hostile to or against democracy (see also: Pollack et al. 2014).

2.2 Islamophobia

The first national report focusing exclusively on Islamophobia in Germany was published in 2016, within which Anna E. Younes (2016, p. 186) describes Islamophobia/anti-Muslim racism as a historical discourse marshaling a variegated set of stereotypes around the idea of a prototypical Muslim subject positing an innate difference and incompatibility between Muslims and Germans. This discursive difference and incompatibility rests on the entanglement of contrasting categorization of values (secular vs. Islamic), historical developments (modern vs. anti-modern), attitudes towards gender relations (equality vs. inequality), and racial characterizations (White vs. non-White), which, not only disseminate and reify a “Them and Us” narrative, but also obscure the existence of German Muslims. According to Younes (2016, p.182) contemporary Islamophobia in Germany, on the one hand, deflects the political debate concerning issues of violence, gender inequality, and anti-Semitism to
Muslims, while on the other hand intensifies “the negative associations between Islam, Muslims, discrimination and violence” (Younes 2016, p.182).

The report addressed the reality of Islamophobia during 2015, a crucial moment for its escalation throughout Germany. Not only the anti-Islam organization Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) gained success on the streets, and extensively disseminated its hatred and violence towards Muslims, but also the “‘refugee crisis’ has had the deleterious effect of merging anti-refugee sentiment, Islamophobia and patriotic nationalism into a fuse set to be ignited imminently” (Younes 2016, p.183).

Another venue of inquiry regarding hatred against Muslims has been the comparison between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Schiffer and Wagner (2011), for instance, conclude that at least four analogous patterns can be found: “[c]ollective constructions, dehumanisation, misinterpretation of religious imperatives (proof by ‘sources’), and conspiracy theories” (Schiffer & Wagner 2011, p.80; see also: Ünal 2016). Historically, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism have shared a pattern of argumentation where the usage of isolated cases and events—explained through an appeal to religiosity—has served to represent the Muslim and Jewish community respectively. One of the most salient differences is that while anti-Semitism has not disappeared from German reality, its public expressions are not socially accepted, which is not the case for Islamophobia (Schiffer & Wagner 2011, p.83; Schiffer & Wagner 2009). Besides, the stereotyping of Jews and Muslims have produced contrasting representations, while the former are deemed as superior in terms of intelligence, and socio-economic status, the latter are represented as inferior on account of “underachievement” in the school system and having low rates of employment (Schiffer & Wagner 2011, p.81). A recent example of these racial narratives can be found in the so-called Sarrazin debate, which refers to the publication and ensuing public reaction to Thilo Sarrazin’s book Germany Undoing/Abolishing Itself 2010. Sarrazin’s book conspicuously related statistics to eugenics and became Germany’s best-selling book in 2011. Sarrazin argued in his book about Germany becoming dumber on account of the “growing” Muslim population while also writing about the “‘average higher intelligence of the Jews’ passed through a Jewish gene” (quoted in: Gilman 2012).

Moreover, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism developed as reactions towards different factors and temporalities connected with them, i.e. the “legal enfranchisement and increased social mobility” of Jews during the 19th century and the “growing participation of Muslims in broader society” nowadays.
Likewise, to both religious communities it has been imputed the accusation of living under their own rules, sealing themselves off from the wider national community “and harboring hostile feelings towards it” (Shooman 2012b, p.17). This construal furthermore has been related to negative perceptions about the belonging of Judaism and Islam to the nation. However, important rhetorical differences can be found, whereas anti-Semitism during the 19th century was “closely linked to a broader frustration with modernism with those in power indiscriminately portraying Jews as advocates for and symbols of communism, capitalism, feminism and liberalism”, contemporary Islamophobia has been systematically “justified as a defense of modernity”, in which the argument characterizes Muslims as enemies of secularism, human and woman’s rights, and democracy (Shooman 2012b, p.19).

2.3 Anti-Muslim Racism

Iman Attia (2007b; 2009; 2011) has been one of the pioneer scholars addressing hatred against Muslims through the concept of anti-Muslim racism. Attia underscores Orientalism’s legacy in the representations of Muslims and Islam in the German sociopolitical debate, and the racial use of culture to address Islam as an irrational culture possessing an innate sense of violence (Attia 2007a, p.7), thus the representation of Muslims in Germany can be seen as being part of the “culturalization of the Other” expressed by means of cultural racism (Attia 2007a, p.10). Moreover, Attia (2007a, p.17-19) mapped the most recurrent discursive strands of anti-Muslim racism onto three interlocking critiques levered to Islam and Muslims: the critique of patriarchy, namely, discourses around accusations of gender inequality inside Muslims communities, in particular so-called honor killings, forced marriages, and domestic violence; the critique to anti-Semitism, where Muslims are accused of being perpetrators and enactors of violence against Jews; and the critique to religion, which posits the incompatibility of Islam to secular forms of governance.

Drawing on Attia’s work, Shooman’s (2010) research has focused on the circulation of racism in the media, analyzing openly racist discourses, and stressing its virulent diffusion on the Internet. Shooman’s work pays particular attention to the gendered dimension of anti-Muslim racism in

---

1 Esra Özyürek (2015; 2010) has also analyzed the role of Islamophobia in the process of conversion to Islam. According to her, German converts to Islam tend to schizophrenically move between the tension Islamophobia-Islamophilia, reproducing racism towards non-German Muslims, while asserting their love for Islam.
Germany, and to the instrumentalization of feminist claims to racially represent Muslims as gender unequal (Shooman 2014).

Hernandez Aguilar (2014; 2015; 2016; 2017) has addressed anti-Muslim racism in the frame of the German state by focusing on the institutionalization of the German Islam Conference (hereafter DIK), its protocols, and procedures. The DIK is an initiative of the German government seeking to enhance the integration of Muslims and Islam into German society and the German institutional framework respectively, and thereby to alleviate what has been deemed as a social reality marked by “cultural conflicts”. According to Hernandez Aguilar, the DIK can be seen as the materialization of anti-Muslim racism in the state on account of the overall approach of this institution, namely, representing Muslims as problems to be solved by means of governmental and biopolitical techniques of power.

3. Background: Muslim population in the country

The hegemonic narrative about Muslim presence in Germany traces back its origin to the post-war era when West Germany recruited labor from foreign countries known as the “guestworker” program. This narrative, however, has not only politically served to call for Muslims integration, but also obscures the long history of Muslim presence in the territory. Already by 1764, a Turkish embassy was established in Berlin (Almond 2010,p.4), there were also Muslims as subjects of German colonialism (Habermas, 2012; Schulze, 2000; Schwanitz, 2008; Tezcan, 2012), as thriving communities in Berlin during the interwar period (Baer 2015; Abdullah 1981; Jonker 2016), and also as prisoners of war and soldiers (Motadel 2014).

The DIK commissioned the first nationwide survey about Muslim life in Germany (hereafter MLG), published in 2009. This document has become authoritative knowledge concerning socio-demographical data about Muslims despite the different critiques raised to its method and the parameters to determine who counts as a Muslim.²

According to the MLG-report the estimated number of Muslims living in Germany oscillates between 3.8 and 4.3 million (Haug et al. 2009), thus the percentage of the Muslim population vis-à-vis the overall population “stands at between 4.6 and 5.2 percent” (Haug et al. 2009, p.75). The total number of Muslims in Germany was broke down between “foreign Muslims” and Muslims with German

² Riem Spielhaus (2013) criticized the homogenization impetus running throughout the MLG-study, and the conflation of the categories ethnicity, religion, and identity. Moreover, critiques have also been raised in regard to the study’s unwillingness to count converts as Muslims, and by defining Muslims not in terms of their religiosity, but rather on account of their “geographical origin” and their surnames (Hernández Aguilar 2015, pp.137–147).
nationality, with 55% and 45% respectively. An update of these figures was published at the end of 2015 (Sitchs 2016). Accordingly, the number of Muslims has increased to an estimation between 4.4 and 4.7 million; thus, the percentage of the Muslim population stands at between 5.4% and 5.7%. The increase of around 500,000 in comparison with the previous estimate is given to the fact that during 2015 Germany accepted refugees from “predominantly Muslim countries” (Sitchs 2016, p.5).

In regard to the structure of the Muslim population, Turkey was the country of origin for 63.2% of the overall Muslim population, numerically followed by Muslims from Southeast Europe with 13.6%, Muslims from the Middle East with 8.1%, Muslims from North Africa with 6.9, Muslims from Southeast Asia with 4.6%, those from Iran with 1.7%, from “other parts of Africa” (sic) with 1.5%, and Muslims from Central Asia, with 0.4% (Haug et al. 2009, p.91). Regarding denomination, the majority of Muslims living in Germany are Sunni with 74.1%, followed by 12.7% of Alevi, 7.1% of Shi’ite, 1.7% of Ahmadi, 0.1% of Sufis, 0.3% of Ibadis, and 4.0% of other denomination (Haug et al. 2009, p.92).

When it comes to the gender structure, the MLG-report documented “a surplus of men” (Haug et al. 2009, p.94) with 53% and 47% female. Moreover, the Muslim population is younger in comparison to the overall population, with an average age of 30.3 years old (Haug et al. 2009, p.97). Besides, 98% of the Muslims “live in the old Federal states and East Berlin” (Haug et al. 2009, p.101).

Regarding the state relationship with Islam, Germany is a secular state accommodating religions in the public arena through the legal figure of the Corporation of Public Law, which grants to recognized religions—Christian churches and the Jewish community—several benefits; comprising the possibility to collect taxes from those registered to the corporate body, and the employment of civil servants (Robbers 2001, p.651). Moreover, corporate bodies can have the prospect to offer religious courses in public educations and to determine its content (Rohe 2008, p.53; Robbers 2001, p.646; Rosenow-Williams 2012).

Islamic organizations appeared around the end of the decade of 1970s, after the stop of the “guestworkers’” recruitment in 1973, prompting some migrants to stay in the country and the reunion with families and relatives (Thielmann 2008, p.3). This context gave an impetus for establishing the first Muslim organizations such as the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) founded in 1985, and the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB) in 1984. Since then, different Muslim organizations have pursued—without success— their recognition as Corporations
of Public Law (Thielmann 2008, pp.3–4; Rohe 2008, p.57; Rosenow-Williams 2012, p.108). Thus, instead of being organized as corporate bodies, Muslim organizations have the status of foundations or registered associations.\(^3\)

Retrospectively, 2006 can be seen as a watershed in the relations of the state with Muslim organizations, Islam, and Muslims in general. By initiative of the Minister of the Interior, the government established the DIK as a forum of dialogue between state and Muslim representatives. From the outset, the DIK was comprised of 30 participants, 15 representatives of the state and 15 Muslim representatives selected by the Ministry of the Interior. Regarding Muslim representatives, the Ministry allocated 5 seats to spokespersons of the Muslim organizations, and 10 seats to non-organized Muslims, including well-known critics of Islam such as Necla Kelek (Shooman 2010; Hernandez Aguilar 2015). According to the DIK (DIK & Chalîl Bodenstein 2009), this segmentation responded to the idea that the organizations represent only a third of the Muslim population, thus the non-organized Muslims would allegedly represent the rest of the Muslim population. Despite being portrayed as open and democratic, the structure of the DIK was heavily criticized in particular for excluding Muslim women wearing headscarves from the forum and discussion (Shooman 2010; Hernandez Aguilar 2015).

The DIK marked important ruptures with previous politics of migration since conditionally accepted Islam and Muslims (Peter 2010) as part of German society, while, at least outspokenly, having a positive stance regarding the legal incorporation of Islam. Though, the DIK also kept in place, and even enhance integration and security policies targeting Muslims (Rodatz & Scheuring 2011; Hernández Aguilar 2015).

Hitherto, the biggest Muslim organizations in the country still pursue their incorporation as Corporations of Public Law, which constituted one of the central reasons to participate in the DIK (Tezcan 2102). While the organizations saw the DIK as an opportunity to pursue their recognition; the state’s representatives approached it, “as an opportunity to specify the conditionality of the legal recognition (Lewicki 2014, p.78). Thus, the DIK was established not only to integrate Islam, but also to determine how such a process would take place. Furthermore, it has been argued that the DIK has

\(^3\) In 2013, for the first time a Muslim organization, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat acquired the status of Corporation of Public Law in Hessen (DIK 2013) completely independent from the cooperation with the DIK.
strategically used the recognition of Islam as a mechanism of control and regulation of Muslims, in particular by conditioning its granting through cooperation in national security issues (Hernández Aguilar 2017). The DIK’s different approach towards Muslims can be understood as “a passage from a primarily negative, or coercive, exercise of power to a positive, or productive one” (Peter 2010, p.128), seeking the normalization of Muslims, its reformation into German-Muslims (Hernández Aguilar 2015; 2016).

4. The formation of anti-Muslim hatred: German Orientalism and the forgotten Colonies

Regarding German Orientalism, Edward W. Said (1978, p.19) regretted not paying enough attention to its scholar growth during the 19th century. While German Orientalism was not comparable with the developments in France or England—given that it was almost exclusively the subject of imagination with no “real” colonial reference—it shared the “kind of intellectual authority over the Orient within western culture” (Said 1978, p.19).

This changed at the end of the 19th century with the rise of Imperial Germany in 1871 and its colonial expansion in Africa. Then, Germany possessed “real” Oriental references prompting the development of concrete policies. By 1900, the German empire ruled approximately 3 million Muslims in its East African colonial territories, the north of Cameroon and Togo (Schulze 2000, p.25). At this moment, the German empire developed a Middle-Eastern policy, an Islampolitik, after the Berlin’s national Colonial Congresses of 1905 and 1910, where Islam and the danger it represented to the colonies was heavily discussed (Habermas 2012, p.125), but also in relation to the German-Ottoman collaborations (Schwanitz 2008; Tezcan 2011; Tezcan 2012; Habermas 2012). This was also the time when Oriental studies developed in German universities (Wokoeck 2009), to some extent, addressing the need to “to train civil servants working in zones under German control in Africa with Muslim populations” (Schwanitz 2010), for which “the Colonial Institute of Hamburg was founded in 1908” and where “Carl Heinrich Becker, the father of modern Islamic studies in Germany, held the first chair of Oriental history and culture” (Schwanitz 2010).

Ian Almond (2010; see also: Marchand 2009; Kontje 2004; Berman 2007; Wokoeck 2009) has been one of the researches addressing the particularities of German Orientalism left out by Said. Almond traces the figurations of Islam and Muslims in key figures of German thought during the 18th and 19th century. German Orientalism possessed a unique characteristic vis-à-vis the Orientalism stemming from British and French intellectuals, namely, each German thinker showed seemingly contradictory
ideas about Islam and Muslims. Thus, Herder “could call Arabs a ‘savage people’ one year and praise them as sublime poets the next” (Almond 2010, p.1). A similar pattern found in figures like Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Weber (Farris 2014; Farris 2010; Turner 1974; Turner 1978).

In the aftermath of the Second World War and the “guestworker” program, migrants arriving in the country were not labeled and treated primarily as “Orientals” or Muslims, but as “guestworkers” (Attia 2007a). A categorical shift occurred around the 1980s, when the German government realized that the “guestworkers” were staying, producing a discursive change in the categorization from temporary workers to cultural foreigners. Then, statements about the workers’ class origin articulated to stress their cultural incompatibility with German society, self-represented as modern and enlightened. Thereafter, and in the context of worldly circumstances, such as the 9/11, the “peasant from Anatolia”, a recurrent image in the stereotyping of the cultural foreigner, came to be produced as the “Islamic fundamentalist”. Thus, a discursive operation occurred whereby “migrants” became associated with Islam, or as has also been deemed the “Muslimization of migrants” (Schiffauer 2014, p.316; see also: Yilmaz 2014; Shooman & Spielhaus 2010; Spielhaus 2010; Spielhaus 2013). Political discourses began to relate and culturalize social behavior, religion, and nationalities crafting a new scheme of social classification (Attia 2007a, p.9). This process resulted in the discursive construction of religion and nation in cultural terms. Therefore, Orientalism and anti-Muslim racism have been stages of the social construction, normalization, and domination of the imagined Other.

4.1 Hate crimes against Muslim

Against the discursive background outlined above it is possible to argue about a long, complex, and changing discourse representing Muslims and Islam as threatening, and as foreign to the German nation and culture. This discourse, in effect, has structured how Muslims and Islam have been perceived and rendered as different from Germans and Germany. The German reunification in 1989, for instance, revolved around imaginaries about who can and will belong to the reunified nation to come. Thus, it entailed politics of inclusion and exclusion branded by racial narratives about who could claim enfranchisement as a legitimate German citizen, and it also sparked a series of racist and violent attacks against subjects perceived as non-Germans.

More than a decade after the reunification and the widespread violence against those perceived as non-Germans, the German government established in 2001 the system of politically motivated criminality (Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität, hereafter PKM) as “a unified federal system for
Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Germany
Dr Luis Manual Hernández Aguilar
CIK: Working Paper 2

classifying, investigating, and collecting data regarding politically motivated crimes” (Amnesty International 2016, p.21) “attempting to harm the free democratic basic order” (BMI 2015a). PKM is sorted out into four different motivations: right-wing; left-wing; foreigner; and other/unspecified (BMI 2015a; BMI 2016). An amendment to the German Criminal Code’s Article 46.2 required that courts register if an anti-Semitic, xenophobic, homophobic, religious-based or disability-based motive was behind the crime, which, if deemed properly, will turn into a penalty enhancement. These crimes then are subsumed under the category of hate crimes (Hasskriminalität), which in turn is part of the PKM system.

Thus, hate crimes in Germany are not counted and investigated as a separate category as in other countries, rather these might (under the discretion of the courts) be counted as politically motivated crimes when “there is evidence that the reason for the attack was connected to the victim’s identity” (HRW 2011). This legal context entails the inexistence of official “reliable and nationwide data on Islamophobic incidents” (Younes 2016, p.182) despite being considered the “most dominant form [of racism] at the present moment” in Germany (Younes 2016, p.182). Regrettably, the absence of official data about Islamophobia can create the distorted impression of this issue as not being a fundamental problem in the structuring of German society, its institutions, and everyday life. The lack of official data and the German government’s determined unwillingness to change this system despite numerous calls of NGO’s representing Muslims and Muslim organizations can be seen as a deployment of Islamophobia articulated by the state.

Different critiques have been raised to the PKM-system including that being foreigner per se counts as a political motivation, regardless of the political motivation of the “foreigner” (Hernández Aguilar 2015, pp.259–261). In addition to the problematic conflation of politically motivated crimes and hate crimes, which may cause that the latter will not be recorded or investigated as such. Moreover, it has been criticized the opacity surrounding “what elements the police are required to take into account when deciding whether or not to classify a crime as a hate crime” (Amnesty International 2016, p.26), let alone that even the PKM-system has been poorly applied (Amnesty International 2016, p.23), and the reporting of crime by the victims tends to not occur either because of their distrust towards the police (Soliman 2016; see also: van Bon et al. 2011; Yegane Arani 2015), or since many

4 For instance, a series of “of six arson attacks on mosques in Berlin between 2010 and 2011 [...] were not registered as PMC as it was argued that the perpetrators had weak criminal responsibility” (Soliman 2016, p.58).
Muslims have accepted this environment of hate as part of their reality (Soliman 2016; Yegane Arani 2015; Peucker 2010). The fact that “statistics on politically motivated crimes registered by German public prosecutors are rarely published” (Soliman 2016, p.58; see also: van Bon et al. 2011) only exacerbates the problems.

Different voices have recommended to the German government amendments to the legal framework regarding discrimination law, precisely, the inclusion of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism as a specific category of discrimination similarly as anti-Semitic attacks have been recorded, as well as changes into how the police collects data about hate crimes. This report aligns itself with these much-needed recommendations. Against this background, the sources from which this report draws on are mostly produced by national and international NGO’s, Muslim organizations and academic research.

Given the lack of a particular category counting hate crimes against Muslims reaching a conclusion based on the police’s statistics would be speculative. However, the same police’s statistics provide a clear overview concerning an increasing environment of hate spreading throughout the country from 2014 onwards. A time where Germany received 1,1 million asylum-seekers (Amnesty international 2016), and anti-refugee protests have discursively linked Islam and violence with refuges.

According to police reporting there has been a rising tendency of a 71% regarding hate criminality in Germany from 2014 to 2015 (BMI 2015c, p.5); 2014: 5.858 — 2015: 10.373 reported cases (BMI 2015c, p.5). Xenophobic attacks were particularly worrying with a recorded increase of 116.2%; in 2014 3.945, and 8.529 in 2015 (BMI 2015c, p.5). Hate criminality against groups of a religion also increased 59.8%; 696 cases in 2014, and 1.112 in 2015 (BMI 2015c, p.5). The overwhelming majority of hate crimes has a right-wing political motivation, 94%; 9.426 cases from the total of hate crimes 10.373 in 2015, (BMI 2015b).

The most substantial escalations pertained to attacks on refugee centers and criminal and violent acts directed against asylum seekers. Concerning the former, the police recorded a rise of 418%; 199 attacks on refugee centers in 2014, and 1.031 in 2015 (BMI 2015b, p.6). Likewise, in only one year, violent attacks against asylum seekers—including damage to property, incitement to hatred, arson attacks and personal injuries—increased even further with a 532% (BMI 2015b, p.6).

The NGO ReachOut also highlighted the increasing tendencies regarding hate crimes (racist and anti-Semitic attacks). During 2016, 320 racist and anti-Semitic attacks were committed only in
Berlin (ReachOut & Berliner Registern 2016), many of which in the detailed chronic targeted specifically Muslims and refugees.

The web-portal IslamIQ has recorded a total of 58 attacks on Mosques from the period 2015 to 2016 (IslamIQ 2017), involving hateful and Nazi graffiti, arsons, damage to property, and the throwing of head pigs and animal blood. By request of the political party The Left (Die Linke), the German parliament released a press statement regarding attacks against Mosques during the first quarter of 2016, with a total of 6 politically motivated crimes (Deutscher Bundestag 2016), although it has been reported that 27 attacks were perpetrated during this same period (Pauli 2016). The newspaper TAZ collected the police reports about attacks against Mosques from 2001 until March of 2016, amounting to a total of 416 (Pauli 2016). It also stated that the DITIB-academy recorded 85 attacks during 2014 and 2015 that were not chronicled by the police (Pauli 2016). Drawing on official reports, the Network against Discrimination and Islamophobia in Berlin (NDI) documented, between 2001 and 2011, “219 politically motivated offences against mosques. Thereafter there were 22 attacks per year on an average” (Yegane Arani 2015, p.44). Muslim organizations have voiced their worries in regard to recurrent attacks on Mosques, the Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM 2014) reported attacks against Mosques as a crucial problem and noted an increasing tendency. Similarly, the antidiscrimination portal of the DITIB reported 78 attacks on Mosques from 2012 to 2014 (DITIB - Antirassismus- & Antidiskriminierungsstelle 2013).

In relation to Islamophobic attacks on Muslim individuals or those perceived as such, the NDI reported disturbing escalating developments. This everyday violence ranges “from every day, so-called micro aggressions (conspicuous discourtesy and detrimental treatment), insults and threats in form of hate mails and hate letters or directly verbal attacks in public space to physical attacks” (Yegane Arani 2015, p.45). The report provides some examples showing the brutality of this growing tendency, affecting in particular Muslim woman: it reports insults to a Muslim woman on a train;
physical and verbal attacks against a 12 years old Muslim girl; an attack to a Muslim family in their car; and an attack against a Muslim woman leaving her unconscious, without her headscarf and drenched in alcohol (Yegane Arani 2015, p.45).

Islamophobic hate speech and hate crimes are particularly problematic for Muslim woman, since they “are more strongly affected by Islamophobic offences than other groups” (Soliman 2016, p.59). Already in 2009 the murder of Marwa El-Sherbini in a German court in Dresden revealed not only the dreadful effects of gendered Islamophobia, but also the role of racism in German institutions and perceptions, the widespread racial bias in the reporting (Attia & Shooman 2010), and the incapacity to speak openly about racism (Fekete 2010).

El-Sherbini, who at the time was also pregnant, was killed in a German court after testifying against a man for verbal abuse, the man attacked El-Sherbini during the court procedures, all of this in front of her young child. During the killing, El-Sherbini’s husband interfered and was wounded by the killer and by a police officer who confused him with the perpetrator. Afterwards, Sabine Schiffer, Director of the Institute for Media Responsibility, argued about racism and Islamophobia as possible factors in the killing, and raised the question about “whether the criminal justice system bears some responsibility for the tragic death” (Fekete 2010). The police officer, who shot El-Sherbini’s husband, accused Schiffer of slander, and initiated a process against her. Moreover, one of the effects of the murder’s media coverage was to sustain the perception of the killing as one isolated and extreme case on East Germany, while leaving unaddressed the extent of racism against Muslims (Attia & Shooman 2010).

Soliman (2016, pp.68-69) also reported different cases of hate crimes against Muslim woman in Germany, including the verbal and physical assault to a 24 years old veiled Muslim women by four men, a verbal attack to a Muslim woman on the train, and a man attacking a 32-year old veiled Muslim woman with a bottle of beer. IslamIQ has also reported attacks with Islamophobic motivation, including harassment and insults against a Muslim woman on a train station (IslamIQ 2013), an attack against a Muslim woman and her kid with a soft-air pistol (IslamIQ 2016a), a physical attack against three Muslim refugees (IslamIQ 2016b), a violent attack by three men against a teacher of Qur’anic lessons (IslamIQ 2015), and a violent attack against a Muslim woman (IslamIQ 2014).

The attacks on Mosques and the hate crimes against Muslim individuals represent concrete deployments of Islamophobia, perpetrated by individuals or small groups. Following Sayyid (2014,
manifestations of Islamophobia can be also deployed as acts of intimidation requiring a certain degree of coordination and planning. Nowadays, PEGIDA represents, so far, the most “popular” political form of intimidation against Muslims and refugees.

PEGIDA is far-right, anti-Islam organization self-described as a group of “concerned and angry citizens” formed in the city of Dresden at the end of 2014. In brief, PEGIDA contests the current German migration and refugee politics. It stands against “the Islamization of the Occident”, namely, the alleged existence of Islamic parallel societies controlling and implementing Shari’ah law in parts of Germany. PEGIDA’s platform is aligned with anti-Muslim racism tropes, conceptualizing while disseminating ideas about Muslims as “as more criminal, sexist, homophobic and terrorist than white Germans” (Younes 2016, p.187). Furthermore, PEGIDA’s “success” on the streets has not only prompted the creation of “sub-branches” throughout other German cities, and countries, but also has positioned an open Islamophobic discourse in mainstream sociopolitical debate (see also: Benz 2016; Vorländer et al. 2016; Younes 2016).

5. Categorical list of most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred
This section discusses the most dominant narratives of Muslim hatred in Germany, and then analyzes its deployments in the arenas of political discourses, media content and how they cement an environment of hate in the everyday lives of Muslims.

One of the most prevailing narratives since 9/11 has been the construal of “Islamic terrorism”, and the threat it represents to German society, often based on the allegation about the lack of secularism in Muslim life, where Islam is deemed as not separating the religious from the political (for a critique see: Schiffauer 2006; Rodatz & Scheuring 2011; Attia et al. 2014). A research commissioned by the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (FADA), for instance, found out the widespread perception among the German population linking the keywords Religion-Islam-Fundamentalism-Terror (Sociovision 2008, p.69).

A significant development can be noticed regarding the accusation of Muslim anti-Semitism (for a critique see: Attia 2007b; Özyürek 2016; UEA 2011; Hernández Aguilar 2015). Here, Muslims are discursively identified as having resentments and hate against Jews as something inherent to Islamic culture. The topic has been present in the DIK’s protocols and prompted the development of different strategies, despite the lack of evidence about so-called Muslim anti-Semitism, and that that the only
anti-Semitism consistently rising and spreading in Germany is that of the extreme right-wing scene (UEA 2011).

The allegation concerning **gender inequality in Muslim communities** and guiding Muslim subjectivities has also been notorious in public debate, representing Islam as a patriarchal system incompatible with the German norms about gender and sexuality (for a critique see: Amir-Moazami 2007; Amir-Moazami 2009; Amir-Moazami 2011; Attia 2009; Attia 2011; Shooman 2014; Rommelspacher 2007). Islamic patriarchy, the argument goes, can influence dissimilar rates of education and employment between Muslim men and women (Haug et al. 2009), a differentiated treatment in the upbringing of sons and daughters (Haug et al. 2009, p.91), and in its extreme manifestation resulting in three violent acts coded as inherently Islamic: forced-marriages, so-called honor killings, and domestic violence (Kelek 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Narratives about a **deviant or abnormal Muslim sexuality** have also gain prominence, linked with the allegedly **innate Muslim homophobia**. In this argumentation Muslims are framed as homophobic (El-Tayeb 2012), but it has also produced an oxymoronic subject formation, the homosexual Muslim (Kosnick 2011). This line of reasoning constructs Islam and Muslims as intolerant to sexual difference, completely opposed to sexual diversity, and tolerance. Conversely, Germany represents a preeminent tolerant space for sexualities, obscuring the still ongoing dissimilar rights between homosexual and heterosexual couples in the country (for a critique see: Haritaworn et al. 2007; Haritaworn 2010; El-Tayeb 2013; El-Tayeb 2012; Dhawan & Castro Varela 2009). The narratives of gender inequality, deviant sexuality, and innate homophobia can be seen as contemporary and reverse reformulations of the trope of the seraglio (Ameli & Merali 2015, p.58). While during the 18th and 19th century, “Oriental” sexuality was represented as the ultimate arena of sexual freedom and promiscuity vis-à-vis Victorian repressive norms, nowadays the trope has been upturned, the West represents a beacon of sexual freedom, while Muslims negate and repress sexuality.

Although the **conspiracy theory about the Islamization of Germany** has been present throughout the last two decades, and heavily borrows from anti-Semitic tropes, with the rise of PEGIDA it took a strong hold in public perceptions about Islam and Muslims (Benz 2016). The very existence of this organization rests upon the idea that Islam is increasingly permeating German cultural and political life with devastating effects. Such permeation moreover has been linked with the construal of **Islamic**
**parallel societies**, depicted as the spatial location ruled by Shari’a law, where radicalization is harbored, and gender inequality represents an everyday reality,

At least three metanarratives embrace and interlock the previous ones. First, there has been the depiction of **non-integrated or unwilling to integrate** Muslims; almost all of the problems associated to Muslims have been explained as the outcome of Muslims’ lack of integration in the German society. Second, permeating all these narratives is to be found the widely accepted perception of an **ontological difference between Muslims and Germans**, which rests upon discursively differentiating Muslims from German in terms of values, norms, historical and secular development as well as racial characterizations. And third, Muslims and Islam have been depicted as possessing an innate sense of **violence** expressing, for instance, in anti-Semitic attacks, terrorism, and violence against woman.

### 5.1 Political discourse/policies

The figure and concept of the “Islamic fundamentalist” made its appearance in the protocols of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) already in 1983, thought, at that moment was conceptualized as a foreign terrorist whose motivation escaped the classical right-left dichotomy of terrorism’s political motivations (Rodatz & Scheuring 2011). Currently, the BfV’s system categorizes three different types of “Islamism” (Schiffauer 2006, p.98). The first, A, refers to groups who threaten the global order and embrace a holy-jihadist-war. The subcategory B concerns groups seeking to change their countries of origin by violent means and came to Germany as political refugees. The subcategory C denotes organizations in Germany, working undercover and by legal means aim at the establishment of an “Islamist” state. The DIK (2011) labeled this last category as “legalist Islamism”.

The conspiracy theory narrative about the “Islamization of Germany”, in particular, has informed this last category.

Importantly, the 9/11 attacks prompted a series of law amendments and new legislation aimed to prevent and combat “Islamic” terrorism. The anti-terror law started its implementation in 2002, followed by the security packages 1 and 2 (BMI 2004, p.1). These measures granted more power to security authorities to deal with what was deemed as a new form of terror, among them, the improvement in the exchange of data and information between German authorities, the prevention of terrorists’ entry to German territory and by means of this the strengthening of the migration regime. Likewise, security operations to identify terrorist located in Germany were reinforced, and
legal provisions for using biometrics in passports and identity cards were put into effect (Schily in: BMI 2004, p.2; for a critique see: Schiffauer 2008; Eckert 2008).

In December 2001, the former Minister of the Interior Otto Schily banned the Islamic organization the Caliphate State (BMI 2004, p.56), the Islamic fundraising association Al Aqsa in May of 2002 (BMI 2004, p.79), and the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir in January of 2003 (BMI 2004, p.135). Different measures were also implemented to combat money laundry linked with “Islamic” terrorist organizations (BMI 2004, pp.68, 99), and stricter security measures came into effect regarding aviation’s regulation (BMI 2004, p.132), and baggage checks in German airports (BMI 2004, p.96).

After 9/11, in Germany raids to mosque and offices of Muslim organization started to be carried out by the security authorities (Fekete 2004, p.11). The German government also implemented a system of religious profiling of foreign nationals whose country of origin was “Islamic”. The inclusion in the system rested on four indicators, “a suspect has to be of (presumed) Islamic religious affiliation, ‘from an Islamic state’, aged between 18 and 24 and not previously have come to the notice of the criminal investigation department” (Fekete 2004, pp.8–9), making an archive of “6 million personal records and singled out well over 20,000 potential suspects, even though there was no concrete evidence against them” (Fekete 2004, p.8; see also Tyrer & Sayyid 2014, p.358).

In 2006, an important change occurred regarding state’s discourses and responses to “Islamic terrorism”. Although the DIK was presented as forum of dialogue and tolerance, from the outset issues concerning national security were part and parcel of the protocols of this institution. In effect, from 2006 onwards, the DIK has been operating as a lynchpin articulating different levels of government and agencies with Muslim organizations in regard to preventive measures against Muslim radicalization, extremism, and “Islamism”. The DIK furthermore was key in the in the appearance of new institutions and policies focusing exclusively on the prevention of “Islamic violence”.

By recommendation of the DIK, the government established in 2008 the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point (CLS), an institution seeking to engage Muslims leaders in cooperating with security authorities to signal those subjects inside the Muslim community susceptible to radicalization. Currently, the CLS operates as the nationwide agency coordinating the different security projects between Muslims and the German authorities.
Likewise, in the frame of the DIK, the former Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich launched the security-initiative “Together Against Extremism—Together for Security” (Friedrich 2011). This initiative was planned as well as a method to engage Muslim organizations and representatives to enhance national security, and to prevent “Islamism” and extremism (Friedrich 2011). Friedrich’s invitation to Muslims materialized in the first Prevention Summit (BMI 2011b), and later it was established as the “Initiative Security Partnership—Together with Muslims for Security”, which aims at counteracting the “Islamist” radicalization of youth in cooperation with Muslim organizations (BMI 2012). One of the first strategies deployed by this initiative was the instituting of the Counseling Center for Radicalization.

In order to promote the counseling center, the BMI designed a publicity plan with special focus on the Muslim population; the outcome—the Missing Person Campaign—was a series of posters distributed all over Germany. The campaign borrows the idea of missing person posters, yet the missing persons in the posters did not disappear or got kidnapped, rather got involved in “Islamist” radicalization processes. This campaign has been criticized as a pristine example of racial profiling, conveying the message that any young Muslim (male or female) could be a potential terrorist (Hernández Aguilar 2015, pp.292–299).

The above discussed political narratives, practices, and institutions can be seen, following Sayyid’s (2014), as state’s deployments of Islamophobia, intensifying the surveillance and control upon Muslims. Another example concerns the still ongoing legal dispute about the headscarf, which is being articulated and articulates Islamophobic narratives about gender inequality, the Islamization of Germany, terrorism, and lack of integration.

The juridical and political battle about the wearing of headscarves for teachers and public servants harks back to the legal dispute interposed by Fereshita Ludin, who was denied the right to be a teacher, based on allegations about the incompatibility of the headscarf with the “neutral” nature of public schools.

In 2003, after a five-year process, the court of Baden-Württemberg decided that the school couldn’t deny to Ludin the right to teach in schools. “The judgment weighed freedom of religion against neutrality in the schools, demanding that the Parliaments of the Länder (responsible for the school system) should pass additional laws either generally forbidding or generally allowing teachers to wear religious garb” (Schiffauer 2006, p.104). However, “the Court still expressed fear that the headscarf
as a religious symbol would, in and of itself, threaten the national education mission” (Korteweg & Yurdakul 2014, p.137; see also: Yurdakul & Fournier 2006).

The decision prompted the federal states of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Bremen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland to enact laws against the use of headscarf in public schools, and Hessen and Berlin passed laws for all public servants. Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thüringen did not enact laws to regulate the use of headscarves (DIK 2014).

After the court’s decision, in the media began a campaign demonizing Ludin and the headscarf, following the usual racial script, picturing the headscarf as a symbol of oppression, backwardness, “Islamism”, violence and gender inequality. German feminist Alice Schwarzer led this campaign (Schiffauer 2006; Partridge 2012) trying to discredit Ludin, by questioning her German citizenship, her faith, and claiming that Ludin was an “Islamist” political operator (for a wider discussion see: Amir-Moazami 2007; Korteweg & Yurdakul 2014; Shooman 2014).

In 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany overturned the ban on teachers wearing headscarves as incompatible with the religious freedom guaranteed in the German Basic Law, and designating the ban as an intrusion into the self-identity of the teacher (BVerfG 2015). However, the court “decided to give schools the primary power to decide whether to accept teachers with headscarves or not, if schools deem the person and the headscarf not to be a ‘direct threat’ (konkrete Gefahr) to the school or to the neutrality of the institution” (Younes 2016, p.191)

As it will become clear below, the ban on headscarf had substantial repercussions outside the scope of public service, expanding and providing legitimacy to discriminatory practices in the school, the labor market, the workplace, and housing, as well as sustaining an environment of hate in which verbal and physical violence against Muslim women have become an everyday reality. The enactment of this special law detrimentally affecting the lives of Muslim women has been articulated and articulates narratives about gender oppression and inequality, conspiracy theories about “Islamization”, lack of integration as well as terrorism and violence, narratives which have also surrounded the naturalizations of Muslims, and showing the complex overlapping between media reporting, the enactment of Islamophobic laws and regulations, and its expansion throughout other spheres of life.
In 2005, the killing of Hatun Sürűcü by her brother became a national and fierce debate throughout the country, and ever since, this atrocious event has been discursively constructed as a proof of the prevalence of “honor killings” in Muslim communities. Shortly afterwards, in 2006 the federal state of Baden-Württemberg introduced a new test for acquiring citizenship, which in the months to come would be labeled as the “Muslim test” on account that it was enforced exclusively for applicants from one of the “57 states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Muslims coming from other countries and other ‘suspicious’ applicants” (Dean, n.d.).

The questionnaire consisted of 30 items, inquiring the applicants’ views not only on terrorism and “their opinions on religious freedom, equality of the sexes, homosexuality, freedom of expression, the concept of honor, and forced marriage” (Phalnikar 2006), including questions such as: “Do you think a woman should obey her husband and that he can beat her if she is disobedient?” (Phalnikar 2006), but also about their perception on Jews” (Hawley 2006; for a critique of the test see: Dhawan & Castro Varela 2009; Haritaworn et al. 2007; Kuntsman et al. 2010; Kosnick 2011; Ewing 2008). This test was eventually abolished and replaced by a nationwide compulsory test for all of those who wanted to apply for citizenship. The “Muslim test” then represented a materialization of Islamophobia advanced by a federal state and being nurtured by the interlocking of different narratives of hate, widely disseminated on the media: gender violence, anti-Semitism, homophobia, lack of integration, the distinction between German and Muslims in terms of values, historical developments and racial characterizations, and terrorism. Concerns about terrorism have also detrimentally influenced the access to citizenship for Muslims with formal membership to a Muslim organization under the monitoring of the BfV since two federal states (Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg) review every naturalization process in the light of the BfV’s register (Schiffauer 2006, p.97).

5.2 Media content

Different sociopolitical events created categorical shifts in the long and complex process of how Germany has interpellated its Others, from the “guestworker”, to the migrant and foreigner to finally arrive to the Muslim. In this process the media has been instrumental in fueling fears and distrust towards Muslims and Islam by means of disproportionately negative reporting equating Muslims with violence, patriarchy and problems.
However, by 1964 the German media seemed keen on the arrival to migrants to the country. In a mythical ceremony German media outlets throughout the country reported with a celebratory tone the arrival of the millionth worker Armando Sa Rodriguez. After the recruitment of “foreign labor” stop, the media discourses swiftly changed and by 1973 some outlets in the country started to circulate apocalyptical scenarios, about “floods” of foreignness overwhelming the nation, its wealth, and its citizens. For instance, the influential magazine *Der Spiegel* (31/1973) published an issue entitled *Ghettos in Germany, One Million Turks*, depicting an apocalyptic scenario where the “tremendous” quantity of foreigners flood the country. The main article of that Spiegel’s issue had the title: *The Turks are coming. Every man for himself*, which racially played with the metaphor of the German nation as a boat reaching a dangerous point because being overloaded of foreigners, who could no longer be tolerated.

The 1990s can be seen retrospectively as an important threshold regarding the portrayals of Muslims in German media (Hafez 2002). In particular the Gulf War 1990-91 played a significant role in the expansion and dissemination of news about Muslims (Hafez 2002). However, also during this decade reports about the oppression of Muslim woman started to gain prominence (Pinn & Wehner 1995; Lutz 1990; Lutz 1993).

The 9/11 attacks were also a significant breakpoint in how media reported and portrayed Muslims, though, many of the tropes used by it were already well cemented, i.e. the oppression of woman, Islam and violence. Schiffer’s research (2005; see also: Schiffer 2007; Schiffer 2004; Peucker & Akbarzadeh 2014; Schneider 2010; Hafez & Richter 2007) has shown how the media has almost exclusively reported negative aspects of Muslim life in Germany associated with problems, e.g., singular cases of gender violence or isolated conflicts in schools (Cohen & Muhamad-Bradner 2012) have been magnified and linked to Muslims in general, and served to sustain a monolithic and homogenous vision of a single Muslim community. Furthermore, Muslims in Germany have been habitually depicted as a backward and uniform group alien to the German society (Shooman 2014). The media furthermore has been pivotal in cementing the associations between Islam and violence, and Muslims and gender inequality (Shooman 2014; Shooman & Spielhaus 2010).

### 5.3 Experiences of discrimination in everyday life

The current environment of hate also deploys in the everyday lives of Muslims; in this section I analyze the effects of Islamophobia in the schools system, the labour market, and housing. These
deployments can be seen as the outcome of practices and actions emerging from the state and its institutions, e.g., the school system, actors form the labour and housing markets, organizations and regular citizens, comprising all of the hatred narratives listed above and being ignited by media reports and institutions. For instance, the DIK has been systematically reporting Muslims’ low rates of employment and underachievement in the education system as index of the lack of integration of Muslims (DIK 2009, p.200). However, these reports attribute “Muslims’ poor performance” in education, and the low rates of employment solely to the former migrants’ social class, while the role that the highly selective and discriminatory German educational system plays has been completely unnoticed, in addition to the role of discrimination and bias towards Muslims in accessing jobs and in the workplace.

Regarding the situation of Muslims in education, the FADA documented evidence of discrimination against Muslim pupils and their parents in the German school system (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2013, p.16). Accordingly, the more or less 70,000 Muslim pupils in German schools encounter serious discriminatory obstacles in practicing their religion. The situation is even more detrimental for Muslim girls wearing headscarves who regularly experience insults and derogatory remarks (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2013, p.16), not only of fellow students and teachers, but also from parents of non-Muslim children.\footnote{The report also documented a case where a young Muslim was mob while praying during the break, and the school decided to forbid praying in order to avoid the escalation of conflicts (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2013, p.110).} Another study from this office reported that 36% of the Muslims interviewed reported discrimination in education (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2012, p.19).

Education is one of most salient arenas where Muslims face routinely discrimination, and Muslim girls wearing headscarves are extremely vulnerable to discriminatory practices and insults (Yegane Arani 2015, p.22). In general, the dominant narrative about Muslims as non-integrated to German society has had discriminatory effects for Muslim pupils in schools, where insults, forms of exclusion and obstruction to their careers have become a constant reality (Yegane Arani 2015, p.22). In the school system thus different narratives of hate such as the lack of integration, gender inequality, and deviant norms of sexuality have interlocked creating a highly discriminatory environment for Muslim pupils in general and young Muslim girls in particular.
A research commissioned by the FADA found out that Muslims, and perceived ones, face different forms of discrimination in the labour market and workplace as well (Peucker 2010). Another study from this office revealed that 38.2% of the Muslim interviewed reported experiences of discrimination in the workplace (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2012, p.19). In the labour market, for instance, employers tend to not hire Muslims on account of the idea that customers may react negatively towards Muslims (Peucker 2010; Scheer 2013; Soliman 2016). This is more pronounced for Muslim women, where the donning of a headscarf stands as a major blockage for accessing a job. Besides, the state’s “ban of headscarf” running from 2003 until 2015 created important barriers for women seeking access to public service, and greatly expanding outside it (Ast & Spielhaus 2012; Soliman 2016; HRW 2009; Senatsverwaltung Berlin 2008).

In effect, Muslim women’s access to labour constitutes one of the most critical materializations of Islamophobia and the way in which it interlocks with gender inequality. Not only women in general face more discrimination than men in the arena of labour, but also “women with a migrant background are more discriminated against than women without a migrant background” (Soliman 2016, p.40). Therefore, being Muslim and donning a headscarf has created an extra burden, a "threelfold discrimination" (Nesrin Odabasi quoted in: Soliman 2016, p.40). Moreover, women have been fired after beginning to wear a headscarf (Peucker 2010, pp.46–48; Soliman 2016, p.45), and “women with Turkish-sounding names who have equal qualifications and education are disadvantaged in comparison to women with German names” (Soliman 2016, p.41; see also: Kaas & Manger 2010).

The environment of hate towards Muslims also manifests itself in the housing market. A recent study found out that housing is one of the core issues of discrimination against persons with “migration background” in Germany, especially in big cities’ competitive market (Schneider et al. 2014). It affects in particular women of Turkish background and is even more pronounced against women wearing headscarves (Schneider et al. 2014, p.15). The report is backed up by a research exploring ethnic discrimination in the German housing markets (Auspurg et al. 2011, p.12), revealing that Muslim and Arab men face the highest discrimination rates in this regard. These results match the findings of a study published by the FADA in which a 33% of the Muslims interviewed declared experiences of discrimination in the search of a living space (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2012, p.19).
Together with discrimination based on tropes on migrants and cultural diversity, Islamophobia has permeated almost every aspect of the social, political, and everyday life of Muslims in Germany, establishing barriers in education, access to the labour market, and housing.

6. Concluding remarks

In Germany, Islamophobia has been articulated throughout the six clusters proposed by Sayyid. As this report presented, not only attacks against Muslims and mosques have been a constant reality in Germany, but also its manifestations have augmented in the last couple of years in relation to the intimidating platform of PEGIDA and its instrumentalization of the “refugee crisis” linking Islam and violence with the conspiracy theory about the “Islamization of Germany”. Moreover, the incessant disparagement of Muslims disseminated by German media has influenced discriminatory practices in different institutional settings like the school and the workplace. In all of this, the German state has played also a key role, not only by neglecting this reality, but also by promoting different discourses problematizing Muslims’ existence, while effecting policies, practices, and creating new institutions such as the DIK, which underlying rationale deems Muslims as deficient subjects and citizens in many regards.

In contemporary Germany Muslims are still seen as not being a “natural” part of German society, rather perceived as deficient subjects who still lack integration. This however bears more relation to the racial imprints surrounding how “Germans” see themselves than with any “objective” measure of integration, encumbering to Muslims with the burden of integrating themselves, while obscuring the highly discriminatory institutional and private environment casting out Muslims from German society, e.g., accusing them of segregating themselves in parallel societies, while, merely finding a house could be extremely difficult in this environment of hate. This constructed sense of difference has had the effect of deflecting problems permeating all of the German society by imputing them only to Muslims, such as violence, gender inequality, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and “deviant” sexuality. Besides, the dominant discourse linking Muslims with terrorism has created politics of fear and suspicion in the society, but also materialized in concrete institutions.
6.1 Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred

1. Non-integrated character or unwilling to integrate
2. Gender inequality in Muslim communities
3. “Islamic terrorism”
4. Distinction between German and Muslims in terms of values, norms and racial characterizations
5. Innate sense of violence
6. Muslim anti-Semitism
7. Islamic parallel societies
8. Muslim homophobia
9. The Islamization of Germany
10. Deviant or abnormal Muslim sexuality

The dominance and prevalence of this hatred narratives have fluctuated in accordance to national and international sociopolitical events or triggered by political statements and debates, for instance, the issue of “wild Muslim-male sexuality” as a form of sexual violence dominated the media outlets and public debate after the “Cologne affair” in 2015, overshadowing, at least for a brief moment, the concerns regarding “Islamic terrorism”, which after the attack on the Berlin Christmas market in 2016 regained its prominence. However, the narrative about the lack of integration, and unwillingness to integrate can be seen as one of the most relevant and stable categorizations in the last couple of decades, given that it organizes, and has been articulated to the other listed narratives. For instance,

---

8 The prevalence and dominance of the narratives listed above have fluctuated in accordance to manifold factors, including how public policy and institutions, media representations, and organizations of the civil society have framed and reacted to alleged problems caused by Muslims and Islam in Germany. This constant fluctuation poses a challenge to the assessment of the strength and dissemination of these narratives in a diachronic and synchronic analysis. Thus, a synchronic take on the unfolding of the narratives would outline particular moments when a narrative dominated the discursive field (e.g. the aftermath of 9/11 the focus on terrorism, or 2005 marked by the preeminence of discussions around gender inequality in particular “honor killings”), while a diachronic analysis would center on how some narratives have remained and organized the deployments of Islamophobia in the arenas of politics, the media, and everyday life for a longer period of time, for instance, the extent to which the narrative of integration has remained constant and mostly unchallenged, at least, for the last two decades. The present report has tried to combine these two frames on analysis based on academic literature about the topic, and a brief survey in media outlets with national distribution. The capacity of a narrative to organize, interlock, embrace, and sustain other narratives was another principle used in this report to rank the strength of the narratives; for instance, the allegation of gender inequality more often than not has been paired with the supposed intolerance of Muslim communities and individuals towards sexual diversity. Both narratives threaded with the distinction between German and Muslims in terms of values, norms, and racial characterizations. In this sense, the dominance of one narrative over others from a diachronic point of view also relates to its entanglement and how this interlocking serves to sustain the problematization of Muslims and Islam.
the DIK assumes that terrorism occurs given the lack of integration, and once integration has been completed terrorist violence will disappear. The same can be said in regard to the allegation of gender inequality, anti-Semitism and violence, where the lack of integration is simultaneously presented as the cause and when achieved as the solution. Integration, furthermore, has been key to differentiate Muslims from Germans in different regards, ranging from explaining where Muslims live to understand how they select their partners and their sexual practices and values.

Moreover, the situation of Muslim women and Muslim women wearing headscarves deserves serious attention. Not only the prospects of becoming a teacher, a jury or a police officer were blocked for more than a decade, and still a future to come, but also Muslim women routinely face everyday violence, discrimination on schools, labour, and housing. The sad irony is that the Islamophobic script portrays Muslim women as victims of Muslim men and Islam, but is in fact the Islamophobic attitudes and imaginaries of German society, the state and its institutions, which are primarily and deeply affecting the lives of Muslim woman and their possibilities. Finally, one of the main problems in regard to the analysis of Islamophobia in Germany concerns the lack of official data documenting the relevance of the phenomenon.
7. References


BMI, 2015b. PMK-Straftaten im Bereich Hasskriminalität 2014 und 2015,


Hawley, C., 2006. Muslim Profiling: A German State Quizes Muslim Immigrants on Jews, Gays and Swim Lessons - SPIEGEL ONLINE. *Spiegel Online*. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/muslim-profiling-a-german-state-quizes-muslim-


HRW, 2009. Headscarf Bans for Teachers and Civil Servants in Germany | HRW, HRW.


IslamIQ, 2016b. Haftstrafen wegen Angriff auf muslimische Flüchtlinge - IslamiQ. Available at:
http://www.islamiq.de/2016/01/26/haftstrafen-wegen-angriff-auf-muslimische-fluechtlinge/
[Accessed March 14, 2017].


Kelek, N., 2006b. Teilnahme von muslimischen Kindern, insbesondere Mädchen, am Sport-, Schwimm- und Sexualkundeunterricht an staatlichen Schulen, Teilnahme an Klassenfahrten, Berlin: BAMF.


Kosnick, K., 2011. Sexuality and Migration studies: The invisible, the Oxymoronic and Heteronormative Othering. In H. Lutz, M. T. Herrera Vivar, & L. Supik, eds. Framing


Soliman, A., 2016. Forgotten Women: The Impact of Islamophobia in Germany, Brussels: ENAR.


Berlin: DIK/BAMF, pp. 35–46.


